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ARTICLES
EPA Finalizes Rule to Guide Secured
Lenders Through CERCLA Maze: Is It
Enough?
Robert G. Boehmer*
I. Competing Demands Placed on Lenders by Regulatory Structure
A. Environmental Responsibility and Community Reinvestment
Lending institutions in the U.S. struggle continually to meet the
demands of a complex and confusing regulatory structure.1 In some
cases, clashes between the laws comprising this regulatory structure
create a "Catch 22" situation for the regulated institutions and in-
terfere with accomplishment of the goals of the regulatory structure.
On one hand, for example, the Superfund statute2 seeks to encourage
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia.
1. Banking leaders claimed, in recent testimony before the Federal Financial Institutions
Council, that U.S. banks are "choking in a maze of regulatory red tape." Banks Say Compli-
ance With CRA, Other Laws Hurts Lending; Consumers Disagree, BNA's BANKING REP.,
June 29, 1992, at 1128. The American Bankers Association recently surveyed 10,000 banks
and received over 1,000 responses. The American Bankers Association has admitted that the
survey is not scientific. However, the survey led the American Bankers Association to conclude
that the banking industry spent over $10.7 billion dollars in 1991 to comply with rules and
regulations. This represents 59 percent of profits. This compliance cost estimate does not in-
clude the costs of complying with the provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 and does not include FDIC premiums paid by the banks. Rehm,
Cost of Compliance Equals 59% of Bank Profits, AM. BANKER, June 18, 1992, at 1; and
Banks Spent $10.7 in Compliance Costs in 1991, an ABA Survey Estimates, BNA's BANKING
REP., June 22, 1992, at 1086.
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
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environmentally responsible lending 3 by imposing liability for haz-
ardous waste cleanup upon lenders whose loans are secured by a con-
taminated site.' On the other hand, the Community Reinvestment
Act 5 requires most federally supervised lending institutions to adopt
and implement plans designed to meet their communities' needs for
capital for maintenance and revitalization.' These goals clash when
the lender finds it necessary to decline an opportunity to lend be-
cause of the possibility that the lender may, at some point in the
future, be held liable under CERCLA for the cost of cleaning up
hazardous substance spills upon the property which would have se-
cured its loan.'
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(35), 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. CERCLA is frequently
referred to as the Superfund law. E.g., Bruce P. Howard and Melissa K. Gerard, Lender
Liability Under CERCLA: Sorting Out the Mixed Signals, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1187, 1188
(1991).
3. It is clear that Congress intended, through the enactment of CERCLA, to create a
strict liability structure both to encourage the safe handling and efficient cleanup of hazardous
substances and to create a funding source for the cost of cleanup. See generally Senate Com-
mittee on Envt. and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (Comm. Print
1983, 3 vols.). However, the intended treatment of secured lenders within this broad strict
liability structure simply remains uncertain. As stated recently by the EPA in connection with
the publication of a final rule defining the scope of the security interest exemption, "The scant
legislative history of the security interest exemption does not shed much light on this issue." 57
Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,345 (1992). This same conclusion has been reached repeatedly by various
commentators. E.g., Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes
on Commercial Lending on Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133, 1139 (1986) (the legis-
lative history provides "no real guidance" on the issue); and Note, Cleanup the Debris After
Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1249 (1991) (the legislative history provides "little insight into this definitional ambigu-
ity"). Accordingly, it is best at this point to simply accept the uncertainty and to proceed
legislatively to correct that uncertainty. See infra note 276. Although the intent of Congress
concerning the treatment of secured lenders within this strict liability structure is uncertain,
the provisions of the Innocent Landowner Defense (discussed infra at note 66) clearly are
intended to encourage environmentally responsible lending. See generally STAFF OF SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ENVT. AND PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SUPERFUND
AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986 (Comm. Print 1990, 7 vols.).
4. See infra notes 24-69 and accompanying text.
5. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1988) (requiring
federally supervised financial banks and savings and loan associations to adopt written plans
specifying action intended to meet the credit needs of the low and moderate income areas of
their local communities and permitting federal regulators to take action, such as the denial of
branching applications, based on a substandard record of meeting those credit needs).
6. Id.
7. Over 88% of 1,700 banks recently surveyed by the American Bankers Association
have changed lending procedures to avoid environmental liability. Over 45 % have discontin-
ued financing certain types of transactions. Over 60% have rejected applications because of
the exposure potential. O'Brien and Nooney, EPA's Lender Liability Rule: A Significant Step
for the Lending Community, ToxIcs L. REP., July 24, 1991, at 246. See also, Grady, Steering
Clear of Pollution Risk, AM. BANKER, Jan. 22, 1992, at 4 (reporting on that same survey);
and Lender Liability Playing a Significant Role in Credit Crunch, ABA Official Says, BNA
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B. Illustrative Hypothetical
Put yourself, for a moment, in the shoes of a typical community
banker in the U.S. On many days you handle, among other things,
consumer loans files, business loan files, human resource problems
and various community responsibilities. You likely find the vast ar-
ray of laws regulating your day-to-day activities to be overwhelming.
At best, you are probably able to manage a general familiarity with
the basic messages conveyed by each of these laws. This general fa-
miliarity likely causes you, in many cases, to simply avoid a proposed
activity when you encounter a legal danger signal rather than
prompting you to spend the time and money to analyze the legal
aspects of the problem in depth.
As an example, assume that a customer applies for a secured
loan to acquire a building in a moderate income area of your com-
munity. The prospective borrower wants to open up a dry cleaning
establishment at a location which was used by the prior owner to
manufacture paint. You want to make the loan. It is a solid business
proposition, the customer has a good credit history and the loan will
further your goals concerning investment in low to moderate income
areas of your community.
Assuming away blissful ignorance of the law, the messages sent
to you by federal law in this case probably support, at first blush,
your desire to make the loan. The loan will likely bolster your Com-
munity Reinvestment Act record. However, CERCLA likely conveys
different messages to you. Both the prior use of the property' and its
proposed use9 are legal danger signals giving you concern about the.
liability exposure of your institution under CERCLA. How might
you react?
A first possibility is that the prior or proposed use of the prop-
erty will simply force you decline the loan based on your institution's
internal policy.1" If your internal policy does not foreclose the possi-
bility of extending credit in this situation, it is likely that you will
seek to minimize risk by requiring a clean environmental audit as a
condition to making the loan.11 If that audit discloses problems, the
BANKING DAILY, Oct. 17, 1991 (reporting that the chief economist for the American Bankers
Association identified the fear of environmental liability as an "important factor" contributing
to the credit crunch).
8. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
10. O'Brien and Nooney, supra note 7.
11. E.g., Schnapf, How to Conduct an Environmental Due Diligence Investigation,
CoM. LENDING REV., at 29.
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likely result is, again, a denial of the application."2 If an existing
environmental problem is not revealed by the audit, the proposed use
of the property will likely induce you to carefully tailor your loan
documentation 3 in order to minimize liability should your customer
later be involved in a spill of hazardous substance on the property.
If you, as the lender, proceed as described above, have the goals
of the Superfund law been advanced? In a limited sense, possibly
yes. The environmental audit encourages identification of hazardous
waste sites. Also, the obligations placed upon the borrower by the
enhanced documentation may encourage environmentally responsible
behavior. In the broader view, the answer is probably no. It is cer-
tainly hard to see how encouraging responsible lenders to avoid envi-
ronmentally sensitive loans makes a dent in the serious natural prob-
lem involving the clean-up of toxic dump sites. Similarly, the manner
in which the courts have applied the provisions of CERCLA to se-
cured lenders' 4 encourages them to take a less active role in the
monitoring of their borrower's activities. This likely negates many of
the beneficial results of the enhanced loan documentation. 5
What is the net result in this hypothetical situation? First, the
goals of the Community Reinvestment Act have been thwarted. Sec-
ond, the goals of CERCLA may have been advanced, but only
insignificantly.
II. Scope of this Article
This article addresses the quandary facing secured lenders illus-
trated by the above hypothetical. The article first describes the pro-
visions of CERCLA relevant to an analysis of the liability exposure
of secured lenders. A key provision of CERCLA exempts secured
lenders from CERCLA liability when the lenders' degree of involve-
ment with the management of the borrower's business remains be-
neath a certain threshold level. This exemption is commonly known
as the Security Interest Exemption.' 6
The Security Interest Exemption has spawned a series of federal
cases' 7 construing the scope of that exemption. Unfortunately, those
12. O'Brien and Nooney, supra note 7.
13. See infra note 23.
14. See infra notes 70-150.
15. But see States, Pollution Solutions for Banks, BANKERS MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at
27 (reporting on a bank using a procedure called bioremediation to introduced microbes into
contaminated sites to clean the sites).
16. 42 U.S.C. §9601(2)(A) (1988). See infra notes 48-49.
17. See infra notes 70 to 150.
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cases have created massive uncertainty about the scope of the Secur-
ity Interest Exemption.1" Accordingly, the article next presents a
chronological description and analysis of these judicial interpreta-
tions of the Security Interest Exemption to demonstrate both the
broad nature of the secured lender's liability potential, as well as the
conflicting and continually changing messages delivered to lenders
by these cases.
The furor in the lending community1 ' set off by these court de-
cisions prompted the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to be-
gin work in 1990 on an administrative rule construing the Security
Interest Exemption20 and to publish a proposed rule in 1991. Addi-
tionally, several proposals for federal legislation to address that issue
were seriously debated during 1991.21 None of those legislative pro-
posals have become law but the EPA did publish its administrative
rule in final form (the Final EPA Rule) in early 1992.22
This article focuses on the Final EPA rule. The rule is first de-
scribed in detail. Its provisions are then compared to an earlier pro-
posed version of the rule in order to demonstrate potential weak-
nesses in the rule. The article argues that while the Final EPA Rule
has solved some problems for lenders, a few gaping holes in its cover-
age remain. To conclude the article, an argument for a legislative
solution is presented.
It is beyond the scope of this article to present a complete dis-
cussion of the various means being used by financial institutions to
avoid CERCLA liability.2 3 However, the practices spawned by the
18. Compare the case discussed at infra notes 126-41 with the case discussed at infra
notes 142-50 for an example of this uncertainty.
19. E.g., Brian W. Smith, Cleanup Law Hazardous to Banks With Deep Pockets, AM.
BANKER, July 18, 1990, at 4. See infra note 151. But see Stephen Kleege, Lenders Doubt
Report That Belittles Cleanup Liability, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 1991, at 6 (noting that some
experts believe that the liability exposure has been exaggerated).
20. See infra notes 152-54.
21. See infra notes 238-75.
22. See infra note 155.
23. See generally Stephen Kleege, Clean Lending, AM. BANKER, Apr. 27, 1992, at 2A
(reporting on availability of insurance at a cost of approximately I % of a typical million dollar
loan to cover environmental exposure but reporting that the process to obtain the insurance
may take nine months); Grady, Steering Clear of Pollution Risk, AM. BANKER, Jan. 22, 1992,
at 4 (emphasizing the importance of a written policy of environmental risk management
adopted by the board of directors); Slater, Pollution Solutions For Bankers, BANKERS
MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 27 (reporting on bank access to databases maintained by companies
in the business of collecting information on environmentally sensitive sites); Howard and Ge-
rard, supra note 2 at 1217-18; Kleege, Lenders Seeking Ways to East Pain of Cleanup Liabil-
ity, AM. BANKER, Dec. 10, 1991, at 12 (reporting on a company which is in the business of
providing computer searches of land records for evidence of contamination); Kleege, Growing
Cadre of Experts Leads Bank Past Cleanup Traps, AM. BANKER, Sept. 10, 1991, at 11 (re-
porting on the trend toward the hiring of environmental review specialists by banks); Schnapf,
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uncertainty surrounding the Security Interest Exemption, rather
than furthering the goals of CERCLA, foster paperwork rather than
positive solutions. Accordingly, these practices are discussed in vari-
ous portions of the article in order to demonstrate this aspect of the
problem.
III. Statutory Provisions Creating Superfund Liability Potential for
Lenders
A lender must evaluate its CERCLA liability potential in con-
nection with virtually every secured loan because of the broad brush
approach taken by CERCLA to impose liability for hazardous waste
cleanup. A secured lender is liable under CERCLA any time a re-
lease or a threatened release of a hazardous substance takes place
causing response costs to be incurred24 and the lender falls within
supra note 11; Stephen Kleege, Some Tips on Assessing Environmental Risk, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 30, 1990, at 10 (reporting views of environmental law lawyer who recommends guaran-
tees of borrower's compliance with environmental laws, indemnifications by borrowers, insur-
ance against environmental hazards site inspections and avoiding entanglement with manage-
ment of borrower's business) Beutelschies, Lenders Can Avoid Liability For Cleaning Up
Waste Sites, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 1990, at 4 (reporting on use of pre-loan environmental
questionnaires, environmental audits, environmental covenants, warranties and indemnities,
contractual property use restrictions and contractual notification provisions concerning the oc-
currence of certain events such as hazardous substance spills); Gebhardt, The Environmental
Inspection Easement: An Essential Commercial Loan Document, BANKING L.J., July-Aug.
1990, at 317 (giving the lender the access to borrower's property to assess environmental liabil-
ity upon the occurrence of a default); Charles E. Davidson, Environmental Considerations in
Loan Documentation, BANKING L.J. July-Aug. 1989, at 308 (emphasizing the importance of a
pre-loan environmental questionnaire); Rowley and Witmer, Assessing Environmental Risks
in Booking a Loan, COM. LENDING REV., Winter 1988-89, at 53 (stressing the importance of
written representations by borrowers concerning compliance with various environmental laws,
encouraging the use of environmental auditing and suggesting that the use of provisions such
as borrower indemnification of the lender, and waiver of jury trial provisions be considered
when documenting the loan).
Perhaps more importantly, lenders should consider requiring insurance which specifically
insures against this type of risk at the time of making the loan. See generally, Olsen, Pollution
Predicament, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1991, at 6; Krauss, Finding Pollution Liability
Insurance Is No Easy Task, INVESTOR's DAILY, Aug. 14, 1991, at 8; Kleege Cleanup Insur-
ance Draws Interest; Colorado Engineering Firm Branches Out to Offer Policy, AM. BANKER,
July 23, 1991, at 8. Court decisions have not been uniform in addressing the issue of insurer
liability for pollution clean-up under comprehensive general-liability policies. Environmental
Cleanup Is a National Problem, But Superfund Provisions Threaten to Dump the Burden on
Reinsurers, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR Sept. 1991, at 143. Eugene R. Anderson and Jordan
Stanzler, Maybe You're Not Really Naked, ABA BANKING J., Aug. 1991, at 24; and Rice,
Business and the Environment; Discovery of Lost Insurance, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 29, 1991
at 16. But see Hathaway, Borrowers Should Examine Pollution Insurance to Ensure That
Coverage Is Worth the Cost, MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE, June 29, 1992, at 2.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Note that CERCLA is not the only possible statutory
basis for liability of a secured lender in the cases of environmental cleanup. Other state and
federal statutes must be considered. See, e.g., Brooks J. Bowen, Liability for LUSTs is an
Exercise in Confusion, A.B.A. BANKING J., June 1991, at 28; Kass and Gerrard, Lender Lia-
bility for Water Pollution, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 20, 1991, at 3. Additionally, lenders must now
consider the possibility that they will be held liable upon a theory of aiding and abetting
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one (or more) of the categories of responsible parties established by
CERCLA (Responsible Parties). 5 The federal government may re-
cover the costs and damages specified by CERCLA in a civil action
against responsible parties.26 Similarly, a private party may do so. 2 7
A. What is a release or a threatened release of a hazardous
substance?
When a secured lender is evaluating its CERCLA liability po-
tential, the liability triggering events that concern the lender are
both "releases '28  and "threatened releases ' 2 9 of hazardous sub-
pollution. O'Neill v. Q.L.C.R.I., 750 F. Supp. 551 (D.C. Rhode Island 1990). See generally
Voorhees and Steele, Birth of a New Lender Liability Theory? Aiding and Abetting a Bor-
rower's Violation of Environmental Laws, Toxics L. RPTR., Jan. 8, 1992, at 950 (analyzing
the above Rhode Island case); Aiding and Abetting Pollution Case Nightmare for Lenders,
Attorney Says, BNA's BANKING REPORT, Oct. 21, 1991, at 666 (reporting that the above
Rhode Island case creates a new theory of lender liability because it is the first reported deci-
sion allowing an aiding and abetting claim against a lender in an environmental case).
25. 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1988). See infra notes 37-50. See generally Barr, CER-
CLA Made Simple: An Analysis of Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAW. 923 (1990). A wave of articles has
passed through the literature since 1986 analyzing various aspects of this liability potential.
See generally Note, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CER-
CLA's Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (1991); Howard and Gerard,
supra note 2; Burcat, Shorey, Chadwell and O'Connell, The Law of Environmental Lenders
Liability, 21 E.L.R. 10464 (1991); Fogarty, The Legal Case Against Lender Liability, 21
E.L.R. 10243 (1991); Blinn, An Obstacle Course for 'Fleet'-Footed Lenders; Whose Responsi-
bility is Environmental Cleanup?, TEX. LAW., Mar. 11, 1991, at 28; David R. Berz and Peter
M. Gillon, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: In Search of a New Deep Pocket, BANKING L.J.,
Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 4; Freeman and Guizar, Fleet Factors Update: Participation in Manage-
ment, CoM. LENDING REV., Win. 1990-91, at 41; Stanley M. Spracker and James D. Barnette,
Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 527 (1990); Sharon E. Jaffe and
Lisa A. Schoolman, Hazardous-Waste Legislation Affecting Lender Liability, BANKING L.J.,
Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 422; Simons, Issues in Lending. . .Lender's Exemption for Environmental
Cleanup and the Fleet Factors Case, J. OF COM. BANK LENDING, Sept. 1990, at 26; Brown,
Fleet Factors Case Produces Gibberish, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1990, at 29; Brian W. Smith,
Cleanup Law Hazardous to Banks With Deep Pockets, AM. BANKER, July 18, 1990, a 4;
Roslyn Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Participation in Management Under Section
101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925 (1989); Susan M. King, Lenders' Liability For
Cleanup Costs, 18 ENVTL. L. 241 (1988); Patricia L. Quentel, The Liability of Financial
Institutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139;
Scott WIlson, Note, When Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazard-
ous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1987); Elizabeth Ann Glass, The Modern Snake
in the Grass: An Examination of Real Estate and Commercial Liability Under Superfund
and SARA and Suggested Guidelines For the Practitioner, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 381
(1987); Burcat, Foreclosure and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Paying the
Piper or Learning How to Dance to a New Tune?, 17 E.L.R. 10098 (1987); Margaret Murphy,
The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes on Commercial Lending and
Investment Activities, Bus. LAW., Aug. 1986, at 1133; Reed, Fear of Foreclosure: United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 16 E.L.R. 10165 (1986).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
27. E.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Dairy Farms, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1078
(1st Cir. 1986).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). See id. § 9601(22) (1988) for definition of
.release."
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stances. Again, the broad definitions given by CERCLA to "release"
and "hazardous substance," heighten the secured lender's concern.
"Hazardous substance,"3 as used in CERCLA, refers to a wide
range of dangerous substances. For example, the solvents used in dry
cleaning operations would normally fall within the scope of the defi-
nition. However, that definition expressly excludes most "petroleum,
including crude oil" as well as "natural gas, natural gas liquids, liq-
uefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of
natural gas and such synthetic gas)." 31
Similarly, the term "release" is broadly defined by CERCLA to
mean, with certain exceptions, "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pour-
ing, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching,
dumping or disposing into the environment (including the abandon-
ment or discarding of barrels, containers or closed receptacles con-
taining any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)."32
Therefore, a "release" would include the intentional disposal by the
borrower of a hazardous substance on its property as well as an acci-
dental spill. However, it is not only an actual release which creates
liability potential. A "threatened release" creates the same type of
exposure.33
B. What is a response cost?
A specific causal connection must, however, be established in
order for CERCLA liability to be imposed on a Responsible Party.
The required causal connection is between the release (or threatened
release) and the necessity of incurring "response" costs. 3 ' CERCLA
defines "response" 35 to mean all action to remove and remedy the
release or threatened release, including any related enforcement ac-
tion.36 It is the threat of being required to pay these response costs
that causes many lenders to back away from otherwise viable loans.
29. Id. § 9607(a)(4). "Threatened release" is not a defined term under CERCLA.
30. Id. § 9601(14). This definition of "hazardous substance" makes reference to sub-
stances listed both in other federal environmental statutes and in other provisions of
CERCLA.
31. id.
32. Id. § 9601(22).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
34. Id. The manner in which this causation requirement of the statute is printed has
caused some confusion. The causation requirement is printed in a way that appears to make it
modify only the provisions of subsection (4) of section 9607 of title 42. However, it has been
interpreted to apply to subsections (1) through (4) inclusive. E.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cum-
berland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1151 n.4 (1st Cir. 1989).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988).
36. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) for the definition of "remedy" and "remedial action"
and id. § 9601(23) for the definition of "remove" and "removal."
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C. Who is responsible for response costs?
If the release or threatened release occurs and causes response
costs to be incurred, then CERCLA establishes four categories of
Responsible Parties." If a person"8 is a Responsible Party, then
CERCLA imposes strict liability39 "without regard for causation." 0
If there is more that one Responsible Party, then all Responsible
Parties are jointly and severally liable under CERCLA4' for any in-
divisible environmental harm. These four categories of Responsible
Parties are:
1. Current owners and operators of the contaminated prop-
erty, 2 (Current Owners); and
2. Owners or's operators of the contaminated property at
the time of disposal" (Former Owners); and
3. Those who arrange for disposal, treatment or transport of
hazardous substance45 (Arrangers); and
4. Those who accept hazardous substance for transport46
(Transporters).
The primary source of CERCLA liability for secured lenders
arises from the possibility of being categorized as a Current Owner
or Former Owner of the contaminated property. Liability as an Ar-
ranger or Transporter is, also, possible but far less likely as a practi-
cal matter.
Liability as a Current Owner or Former Owner arises from the
broad meaning given to that phrase by CERCLA. "Owner or opera-
tor", in the case of a facility, is defined by CERCLA in a circular
fashion to mean "any person owning or operating such facility. 4 7
37. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
38. Id. § 9601(21) (defining "person" broadly to include individuals and entities).
39. E.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
40. E.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md.
1986).
41. E.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988). A Current Owner is liable even if the hazardous
waste contamination of the facility occurred prior to that Current Owner's acquisition of an
indicia of ownership in the facility. E.g., United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1354 (1984).
43. In the case of Current Owners, CERCLA refers to liability if the person is an owner
"and" an operator. In contrast, in the case of Former Owners, CERCLA refers to liability
when the person is an owner "or" an operator. This has been construed to be inadvertent
drafting error. See infra notes 105-107.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
45. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
46. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
47. Id. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).
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Therefore, under applicable state law, a secured lender holding any
"indicia of ownership" in the property securing its loan is potentially
a Responsible Party as either a Current Owner or a Former Owner.
It is at this juncture that the critical issue arises. The CERCLA
definition of "owner or operator" specifically excludes, "a person,
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
the vessel or facility. '48 This exemption is generally referred to as
the "Security Interest Exemption." '49 It is the uncertainty concerning
the scope of this exemption which has befuddled lenders, the EPA
and the courts.
Liability as a Current Owner or Former Owner of the contami-
nated property may attach, not only when the lender holds a security
interest in real property, but in connection with security interests in
personal property as well. This occurs because CERCLA requires
only that the ownership interest be held in a "facility" in order for
the lender to be classified as a Responsible Party, A "facility" 50 is
broadly defined as "(A) any building, structure, installation, equip-
ment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly
owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment,
ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock or air-
craft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of or placed, or otherwise come to be lo-
cated; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use of
any vessel."
D. What costs and damages are potentially recoverable?
If liability is imposed by CERCLA upon a secured lender, the
scope of the costs and damages for which that lender may be held
liable is imposing. That liability includes responsibility to pay all of
the following:
1. All costs of removal or remedial action"' 5 1 by the govern-
48. Id. § 9601(20)(A) (emphasis added).
49. This is the terminology used by the EPA to refer to this exemption from the "owner
or operator" definition. 57 Fed.Reg. 18,344, 18,345 (1992).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988). See id. § 9601(17) for the definition of "offshore facil-
ity" and id. § 9601(18) for the definition of "' onshore facility." If title or control of a facility
was conveyed to a state or local government due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency,
abandonment or similar means, then the "owner or operator" is the person who operated or
otherwise controlled the activities at that facility immediately before that conveyance. Id. §
9601(20)(A)(iii). See id. at 9601(20)(A)(i) (1988) for the definition of "owner or operator" in
the case of a "vessel" and id. § 9601(28) for the definition of "vessel."
51. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). See id. § 9601(23) for the definition of "removal." See id. §
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ment which are not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan;5'
2. Any necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;53
3. Damages for injury to, destruction of or loss of natural
resources.5 4 In addition, the reasonable costs of assessing that
injury, destruction or loss may be recovered.55
4. The costs of certain health assessment or health effects
studies. 6
All of these amounts may be recovered with interest accruing from
the date and at the rate specified by CERCLA. 7
E. Are any defenses available?
A lender, who is otherwise liable under CERCLA, may avoid
liability by establishing "by a preponderance of the evidence that the
release or threatened of release of a hazardous substance and the
damages resulting" from that release or threatened release were
solely caused by (1) an act of God;58 (2) an act of war;59 (3) an act
or omission of a third party (Third Party Defense);"0 (4) or any
combination of those reasons.61
The Third Party Defense is the defense of which secured lend-
ers are most likely to avail themselves. The Third Party Defense has
two separate elements. First, it requires the lender to establish that
the release or threatened release were neither caused by its employee
or agent nor by one whose act or omission occurs in connection with
a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the
lender.6" Second, the lender is required to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it exercised due care63 and took precau-
tions against foreseeable acts and omissions of the third party. 64
In the case of a secured lender seeking to establish the Third
9601 (24) for the definition of "remedial action."
52. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). See id. § 9601(31) for the definition of "national contingency
plan."
53. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). See id. § 9601(25) for the definition of "response."
54. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C). See id. § 9601(16) for the definition of "natural resources."
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988).
56. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(D).
57. Id. § 9607(a).
58. Id. § 9607(b)(1).
59. Id. § 9607(b)(2).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988).
61. Id. § 9607(b)(4).
62. Id. § 9607(b)(3) (emphasis added).
63. Id. § 9607(b)(3)(a).
64. Id. § 9607(b)(3)(b).
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Party Defense, the question is whether that lender had a "contrac-
tual relationship" with its borrower (as that term is used in CER-
CLA). CERCLA's definition specifically includes within the mean-
ing of "contractual relationship" documents such as "deeds or other
instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property
on which the facility concerned is located was acquired by the de-
fendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance
on, in, or at the facility" and one of three circumstances is
established. "
One of these three circumstances is commonly referred to as the
"Innocent Landowner Defense." 6 The defense requires the secured
lender to establish that, at the time of the secured lender's acquisi-
tion of its interest in the facility, the lender neither knew or had
reason to know "that any hazardous substance which is the subject
of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in or at the
facility. 61 7 CERCLA, in addition, provides subjective standards for
determining whether that lack of reason to know existed. Specifi-
cally, the defendant must in order to avail itself of the defense, have
"undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into
the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial practice or customary practice in an effort to minimize
liability."68 In determining whether the inquiry was, in fact, appro-
priate, a court is required to consider any specialized knowledge of
the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price of the property
to its value if uncontaminated, information which is commonly
known or readily ascertainable, the degree of obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of contamination and the ability to detect
that contamination by inspection.69 Because of the specialized knowl-
edge possessed by most institutional lenders, the type of pre-loan in-
quiry necessary for institutional lenders to successfully establish this
defense is much higher than for those not in the business of regularly
extending loans.
The Innocent Landowner Defense might be available, for exam-
ple, to a lender when the property securing the loan was contami-
nated prior to the lender acquiring its security interest. If the lender
is now unable to successfully establish the Security Interest Exemp-
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
66. 57 Reg. Reg. 18,344, 18,353 (1992). This is the term used by the EPA to refer to
this defense.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1988).
68. Id. § 9601(35)(B).
69. Id.
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tion (E.g., the lender participated in the management of its bor-
rower) but is able to establish that it required an appropriate envi-
ronmental audit of the property prior to acquiring its security
interest and the audit failed to disclose the fact that contamination
or the threat of contamination then existed, the defense may apply.
In contrast, the Innocent Landowner Defense would not apply if the
"disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the
facility" occurred after the lender acquired its interest in the prop-
erty. In that case, a lender would need to establish the existence of
the Security Interest Exemption (or one of the other defenses) in
order to avoid liability.
IV. Judicial Interpretations of the Security Interest Exemption
The scope of the Security Interest Exemption has been ad-
dressed to date in only seven reported decisions." Two of the deci-
sions have been at the appellate level.71 Those two decisions have
taken contrasting approaches and the U.S. Supreme Court has de-
clined to reconcile the differences.7 2 The following section chronolog-
ically traces the development of this case law from 1985 to the
present.
A. T.P. Long73
This case involved a dispute over funds held by a trustee in
bankruptcy. The debtor corporation (T.P. Long) previously operated
a rubber recycling plant upon real property (the site) owned by T.P.
Long's sole shareholder and his wife. T.P. Long filed a chapter 11
reorganization petition, the case was converted to a chapter 7 pro-
ceeding and a trustee was appointed. While the bankruptcy proceed-
ing was still pending, some of the assets of the bankruptcy estate
were sold to a purchaser (Tompkins). One of the assets Tompkins
purchased was a tank containing a hazardous substance. In what the
court characterized as an "act of vandalism," ' some of the hazard-
ous substance was released onto the site before Tompkins removed
the tank. Additionally, drums containing the hazardous substance
were buried on the site. After the trustee declined to take remedial
action, the EPA cleaned up the site at a cost in excess of $37,000.
70. See infra notes 73 to 150.
71. See infra notes 126 and 142.
72. See infra note 126.
73. In re T.P. Long Chem, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
74. Id. at 279.
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The EPA then filed an application to be reimbursed from the bank-
ruptcy estate for these response costs. The application was opposed
by the trustee and BancOhio. BancOhio was the owner of a per-
fected security interest in various items of personal property and pro-
ceeds of the debtor, including the buried drums. After ruling that
the bankruptcy estate was liable under CERCLA for the clean-up
costs7 5 and, therefore, entitled to pay those amounts as priority ex-
penses, 76 the court considered the status of BancOhio.
Unencumbered assets of the estate were insufficient to pay the
clean-up costs. As a result, the EPA sought payment out of funds
subject to BancOhio's security interest and held by the trustee. In
reaching its decision to deny the EPA's application, 77 the court re-
jected the EPA's argument that BancOhio was liable under CER-
CLA for removal costs. The court reasoned:
The court finds that even if BancOhio had repossessed its col-
lateral pursuant to its security agreement it would not be an
"owner or operator" as defined under CERCLA. . . . The only
possible indicia of ownership that can be attributed to BancOhio
is that which is primarily to protect its security interest. It is
undisputed that BancOhio has not participated in the manage-
ment of the Long facility. Thus, BancOhio cannot be held liable
as an owner or operator under CERCLA.
7 8
Accordingly, T. P. Long provided an early signal to lenders that
creditors would be entitled to the benefit of the Security Interest Ex-
emption even following the lender's acquisition of legal title through
foreclosure or repossession.
B. Mirabile"9
The next reported decision was rendered when the United
States brought a civil action under CERCLA tQ recover the costs of
removing allegedly hazardous waste from a parcel of real estate (the
site), which was formerly the location of a paint manufacturing busi-
ness. The defendants were the individual owners of the site at the
time the action was filed, Anna and Thomas Mirabile (the
Mirabiles). The Mirabiles impleaded two financial institutions,
American Bank and Trust Company (American) and Mellon Bank
75. Id. at 284.
76. Id. at 286.
77. Id. at 289.
78. In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., at 288-89 (emphasis added).
79. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
GUIDING LENDERS THROUGH CERCLA
(Mellon). American and Mellon then filed counterclaims against the
plaintiff based on allegations of the involvement of the Small Busi-
ness Administration (SBA). The issues, characterized by the court
as issues of "first impression","0 revolved around the circumstances
under which CERCLA liability may be imposed on a person who
provides financing to the owner or operator of a hazardous waste
dump site.81
American was the first lender to become involved in this paint
manufacturing operation. It loaned money to a corporation which
operated a paint manufacturing facility on the site. The loan was
secured by a mortgage on the site. Subsequently, ninety-five percent
of the stock of American's borrower was acquired by another corpo-
ration (Turco). Turco's operations on the site were the cause of the
allegedly hazardous spill.
Mellon's predecessor in interest (Girard Bank) then became in-
volved. A working capital loan was made to Turco secured by
Turco's inventory and assets. When Turco later established an advi-
sory board, one of Girard Bank's officers became a member of that
board. A second officer of the same lender later replaced the first
officer on the advisory board.
The SBA next became involved in Turco's financing. The SBA
loan to Turco was secured by a second lien on the debtor's machin-
ery and equipment, a second lien on the debtor's inventory and ac-
counts receivable, a second lien on the site, and a stock pledge. SBA
regulations at that time required the SBA to provide management
assistance to its borrowers and the SBA was granted the power by
the loan agreement to approve in advance any of Turco's manage-
ment assistance contracts.
Ultimately, Turco filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which
was later dismissed. The court was then required to evaluate the
CERCLA liability of the three above-discussed lenders separately.
American had foreclosed its mortgage on the site. It purchased
the property at the foreclosure sale, informed the county sheriff of
intent to take title, but assigned its interest in the site to a purchaser
before the sheriff's foreclosure deed was delivered. The deed was
then delivered to that purchaser by the sheriff. After the foreclosure
sale, American took steps to protect a building on the site from van-
dalism, inquired about the cost of cleaning up hazardous waste and
showed the property to potential buyers. All of these activities took
80. Id. at 20,995.
81. Id.
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place in a period of several months following the sale. The court
granted American's motion for summary judgment.8 2 In reaching
this decision, the court declined to decide, under Pennsylvania law,
whether American had ever acquired legal title.83 It reasoned that a
decision was unnecessary because all of American's actions, includ-
ing foreclosure and purchase at the foreclosure sale, were undertaken
to protect its security interest. 4 The court ruled that American's ac-
tions did not cause it to be liable under CERCLA. Instead, the court
adopted a day-to-day management test stating:
Thus, it would appear that before a secured creditor such as
ABT may be held liable, it must, at a minimum, participate in
the day-to-day operational aspects of the site. In the instant
case, ABT merely foreclosed on the property after all operations
had ceased and thereafter took prudent and routine steps to se-
cure the property against further depreciation.8"
In Mellon's case an officer of Mellon was on Turco's advisory
board prior to Turco's bankruptcy filing. Another officer of Mellon
(McWilliams) replaced that first officer, and increased monitoring
activities. Ultimately, Mellon seized Turco's inventory with the ap-
proval of the bankruptcy court and sold it at public and private sales.
The court denied Mellon's motion for summary judgment.8a That de-
nial was based on the increased monitoring activities of the second
Mellon officer on Turco's advisory board. The court stated that the
officer's activities in monitoring cash collateral, ensuring proper ap-
plication of accounts receivable and establishing a system for report-
ing by Turco to Mellon would not likely give rise to CERCLA liabil-
ity for Mellon.87 However, the court found a genuine issue of
material fact to exist concerning the possibility of day-to-day in-
volvement by the second advisory board member stating:
The reed upon which the Mirabiles seek to impose liability on
Mellon is slender indeed; however, bearing in mind that all
doubts are to be resolved in favor of that party opposing a mo-
tion for summary judgment, I conclude that, taken as a whole,
the deposition testimony outlined above presents a genuine issue
of fact as to whether Mellon Bank, through its predecessor
Girard Bank, engaged in the sort of participation in manage-
82. Id. at 20,997.
83. Id. at 20,996.
84. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 20,997.
87. Id.
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ment which would bring a secured creditor within the scope of
CERCLA liability. In particular, it would be helpful to have a
clearer picture of McWilliams' participation in the manufactur-
ing processes and of the extent to which Garfinkel acted at the
direction of Girard."
8
In denying summary judgment, the court specifically rejected the
Mirabile's argument that Mellon would be liable under CERCLA
for failure to perform an alleged affirmative duty to advance funds to
conduct the hazardous waste cleanup. 9 Moreover, the court rejected
the argument that the activities of the first Mellon representative on
Turco's advisory board would give rise to CERCLA liability. The
representative's activities were characterized by the court as "gen-
eral financial advice" not related to hazardous waste production or
disposal.9 0
Finally, the court granted the motion of the SBA for summary
judgment.9 First, the court rejected arguments by the Mirabiles
that the SBA should be subject to CERCLA liability because of its
knowledge of Turco's waste disposal practices when it administered
its loan or because it earmarked loan proceeds in a manner that
would have prevented improper hazardous substance disposal.9 Sec-
ond, the court rejected the Mirabiles' arguments that the loan agree-
ment provisions allowing "some degree of involvement" could be
characterized as participation in day-to-day management93 and re-
strictions on Turco's finances exposed the SBA to CERCLA liabil-
ity. The court emphasized that day-to-day involvement never took
place94 and that any participation which did take place was strictly
limited to financial affairs.9" That sort of involvement was not, in the
court's opinion, sufficient to impose CERCLA liability because the
statue specifically requires participation in the management of the
"facility" in order to destroy the secured interest exemption.9
Therefore, the court considered cases concerning the liability of
shareholders who participate in management to be analogous, but
not controlling, because CERCLA does not require that the manage-
ment activities of shareholders giving rise to CERCLA liability re-
88. Id. (footnote omitted).
89. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id., 20,997 n.9.
93. Id. at 20,997.
94. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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late specifically to the "facility. 97
C. Maryland Bank98
By the time Maryland Bank was decided, two rules appeared to
be emerging. First, foreclosure did not deny the lender the benefit of
the Security Interest Exemption. Second, day-to-day management is
the test for the "participation in management" standard.
Although the dicta in Long and the holding of Mirabile does
support the conclusion that a secured lender does not lose the benefit
of the Security Interest Exemption simply by foreclosing upon its
security (i.e., the site of the hazardous substance spill) and purchas-
ing the site at the foreclosure sale,99 substantial doubt concerning
that conclusion was created by the Maryland Bank case. Maryland
Bank & Trust Company (Maryland Bank) had a long standing
banking relationship with Herschel and Nellie McLeod. At some in-
determinate point during that long relationship, Maryland Bank be-
came aware that the McLeods were operating a trash and garbage
business on a parcel of real property (the site). The business in-
cluded allowing others to dump various hazardous wastes on the site.
Later, the McLeods sold the site to their son and the purchase price
was financed by Maryland Bank, secured by a mortgage on the site
and guaranteed by the FHA. After the son's default on the loan,
Maryland Bank foreclosed and purchased the site at the foreclosure
sale.
While Maryland Bank still held title to the site, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency spent over $550,000 cleaning up the site
(after Maryland Bank declined to do so). The EPA then commenced
this civil action against Maryland Bank under CERCLA. In reach-
ing its decision to deny the motion of Maryland Bank for summary
judgment,"'0 the only issue for the court to decide was whether
Maryland Bank was liable under CERCLA as a Current Owner of
the site.101
First, the court ruled that the Security Interest Exemption could
not apply to Maryland Bank since it had become the holder of "full
97. Id.
98. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
99. See supra notes 78 and 84.
100. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 582. The court held that Maryland
Bank had the burden of establishing its entitlement to the security interest exemption. Id. at
578.
101. Id. at 576.
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title."1 2 However, the court then obscured the scope of its decision.
Initially, the court reasoned that
[t]he exemption of subsection (20)(A) covers only those persons
who, at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to
protect a then-held security interest in the land. The verb tense
of the exculpatory language is critical. The security interest
must be held at the time of the clean-up. The mortgage held by
Maryland Bank terminated at the foreclosure sale . . . at which
time the security interest ripened into full title. 0 3
Following this seemingly broad pronouncement, the court then indi-
cated that the acquisition of title via foreclosure might not void the
security interest exemption in all cases. Maryland Bank had held the
property for an extended period of time. Accordingly, the Court did
not consider the issue of whether a secured party who purchased the
property at the foreclosure sale and then promptly resold it would be
precluded from asserting the section 101(20)(A) exemption. 04
In denying Maryland Bank's summary judgment motion, the
court also had the opportunity to construe the confusing and incon-
sistent use of the words "and" and "or" in conjunction with "owner"
and "operator" in the Responsible Party provisions of CERCLA.
Specifically, CERCLA includes as a responsible party a person who
is a current "owner and operator."' 0 5 In contrast, liability is imposed
for interests held at the time of the disposal upon persons who
"owned or operated."'0 6 The court ruled that liability may be im-
posed on a current owner, even if that person is not, in addition, an
operator. 07
D. Nicolet'"°
The next reported decision provided an opportunity for a U.S.
District Court to affirm the day-to-day management test. The
United States had filed an action to recover clean-up costs, future
clean-up costs, interest and litigation costs in connection with a
"'mountain' of asbestos containing material"' 9 located on the site
102. Id. at 579.
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 579, n.5.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
106. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
107. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 577. Accord United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1990).
108. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
109. Id. at 1196.
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of a manufacturing facility and adjoining waste disposal sites (the
site). At the time of this decision, the Environmental. Protection
Agency alleged that it had already spent $2,500,000 or more in the
clean-up of the site. 110
The site had for many years been owned by a corporation
(Keasby) in connection with its manufacturing business. Over a pe-
riod of four years from 1934 to 1938, all of the Keasby stock was
acquired by Turner and Newall (T&N). In 1951, the record owner
of that stock became Turner & Newall (Overseas), Ltd. (T&N(O)).
Nicolet acquired the site in 1962.
The EPA alleged that T&N was a responsible party under
CERCLA under various theories. T&N was alleged to be the alter
ego of Keasby, the sole shareholder of a former owner and an active
participant in management, a person with the capacity to abate envi-
ronmental harm who had failed to do so and the holder of a mort-
gage on the site who had actively participated in management.1 In
denying T&N's motion to dismiss, which the court treated as a mo-
tion for summary judgment, the court stated that, "[E]xisting case
law suggests that a mortgagee can be held liable under CERCLA
only if the mortgagee participated in the managerial and operational
aspects of the facility in question." 12
E. Guidice
13
The Guidice decision required the court to address some of the
inconsistencies in the case law at that time as illustrated most clearly
by contrasting the Maryland Bank"" decision (Security Interest Ex-
emption lost by purchase of property at foreclosure sale) and
Mirabile'1 5 (purchase at foreclosure sale does not cause loss of Se-
curity Interest Exemption when undertaken to protect security inter-
est). This decision was created by a citizens suit commenced against
BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Company (BFG) and based,
in part, on CERCLA. BFG then joined the current owners and prior
owners of adjacent land (the site), including the National Bank of
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1196-97.
112. Id. at 1205. The "case law" referred to by the court was the decision in Maryland
Bank, the decision in Mirabile and the decision of the U.S. District Court in Fleet Factors. As
noted below, that decision in Fleet Factors was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
11 th Circuit but on the basis of different reasoning than that used by the lower court. See
infra notes 126-41.
113. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
114. See supra note 102.
115. See supra note 84.
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the Commonwealth (National Bank), as third party defendants. Na-
tional Bank's involvement with the property began when it extended
a secured (accounts receivable) line of credit to a former owner of
the site, Berlin Metal Polishers (Berlin). Ultimately, National Bank
became the holder of a mortgage on the site when it extended addi-
tional financing to Berlin and took title to the site after a foreclosure
sale.
In ruling against National Bank on its motion for summary
judgment, the court reviewed its activities prior to its acquisition of
title to the site as well as its post-acquisition activities. The court
ruled that the pre-acquisition activities were not sufficient to void the
Security Interest Exemption." 6 Specifically, the court relied on the
day-to-day management test in reaching this conclusion." 7 The
court ruled that pre-foreclosure activities by National Bank did not
rise to the level of participation necessary to destroy the Security
Interest Exemption." 8 These activities included periodic meetings
with Berlin officers to discuss personnel and raw materials issues,
active assistance to Berlin in negotiating for an SBA loan, assistance
to Berlin in connection with government rules concerning waste
water discharge, periodic visits to the site after Berlin ceased opera-
tions, referral of a potential lessee, and an agreement to provide fi-
nancing to a potential purchaser of the site." 9 The court character-
ized these activities as "prudent measures" to protect National
Bank's security interest.120 The court said that this analysis of pre-
foreclosure activity by lenders would foster the goals of CERCLA by
encouraging lenders to carefully monitor the waste disposal activities
of debtors.' 1
The court applied a different analysis to National Bank's post-
foreclosure ownership. First, the court recognized the divergence in
opinion between the Mirabile and Maryland Bank courts. 22 The
court, ultimately, favored the rationale of Maryland Bank. First, the
court concluded that allowing a lender who acquires title to a haz-
ardous waste site an exemption would create a "special class of oth-
116. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562.
117. Id. at 561-62. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon Mirabile and
Nicolet. See supra notes 79-97 and 180-112. It also relied upon the decision of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Fleet Factors, which was eventually affirmed by the 11 th Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals based on different reasoning than used by the lower court. See infra notes 126-141.
118. Id. at 562.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Guidice, 732 F. Sup. at 562.
122. Id.
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erwise liable landowners." ' 123 Second, the court recognized that Con-
gress had seen fit to create such a special class in 1986 by amending
CERCLA to exclude from liability certain state and local govern-
ments acquiring property in limited cases but had declined to create
such a special exclusion for private lenders.124 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the Security Interest Exemption was not available for
the period during which the National Bank was a record owner. 12 5
F. Fleet Factors'26
Although lenders had been uncertain about the impact of fore-
closure on their exposure to CERCLA liability, the court in Fleet
Factors, raised the level of uncertainty to new heights through its
apparent rejection of the day-to-day management standard. The
United States commenced this- action in order to recover the cost of
cleaning up hazardous waste located on the grounds of a textile
manufacturing facility (the site) in Georgia which had previously
been owned by Swainsboro Print Works (Swainsboro Print). The
government had spent over $400,000 in the cleanup of asbestos and
drums containing hazardous substances on the site.
The defendant, Fleet Factors Corporation (Fleet), began its re-
lationship with Swainsboro Print when it entered into a factoring
agreement with Swainsboro Print and received a security assignment
of Swainsboro Print's accounts receivable. Fleet also received a se-
curity interest in the textile facility, its inventory, equipment and fix-
tures. About three years later, Swainsboro Print filed a chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. The chapter 11 petition was converted more
that two years later to a chapter 7 proceeding.
The relationship between Fleet and Swainsboro Print was di-
vided by the Court of Appeals into three time periods for purposes of
analysis: (i) the period beginning with the factoring agreement and
continuing until Swainsboro Print ceased operations at the time of
the conversion of the bankruptcy proceeding to a chapter 7 (Phase I)
about five years later; (ii) the period of slightly more than one year
beginning with cessation of the operations of Swainsboro Paint,
spanning the period during which Fleet foreclosed upon its security
interest in inventory and equipment (not upon the facility itself) and
continuing .until Fleet retained a liquidator (Baldwin) to auction
123. Id. at 563.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
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some of the collateral upon which Fleet had foreclosed (Phase II);
and (iii) the period following the contract between Fleet Factors and
Baldwin (Phase III).
During Phase III, the EPA inspection disclosed hazardous sub-
stance problems at the site. After conducting the clean-up, a county
government ultimately took title to the site at a tax foreclosure sale.
Fleet Factors, although it had a security interest in the site, never
foreclosed upon that security interest and never took title to the site.
The U.S. District Court 12' denied Fleet Factors' summary judg-
ment motion on the grounds that the United States had created ma-
terial issues of fact concerning the availability of the Security Inter-
est Exemption during Phase III. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
11 th Circuit upheld the denial of the motion for summary judgment
but ruled that material issues of fact concerning the availability of
the Security Interest Exemption existed with respect to both Phase
II and Phase III.
The plaintiff first asserted that Fleet was liable as a Current
Owner of the site. The plaintiff's theory was based on the general
rule that a state or local government acquiring title through a tax
foreclosure sale is not liable under CERCLA.12 8 In such a case,
CERCLA imposes liability on the person who was the owner or op-
erator "immediately beforehand."1 29 The court rejected the plain-
tiff's argument that liability is referred back to the last person who
controlled the facility.'3 In this case, the county acquired tile in
1987 and the last involvement of Fleet with the site was in 1983.
The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the site had been abandoned
during the gap from 1983 to 1987 rendering Fleet the owner in con-
trol immediately before the county's acquisition of title.
In contrast, the plaintiff successfully argued that an issue of fact
existed concerning the status of Fleet as a Former Owner. The court,
accepting that the burden of establishing the existence of the exemp-
tion fell on Fleet... and that the mortgage of Fleet constituted an
"indicia of ownership" within the meaning of the security interest
exemption,13 2 characterized the issue of the degree of lender partici-
pation required to destroy the security interest exemption as one of
127. United States v. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff d, 901 F. 2d
1550, cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991).
128. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988).
130. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555.
131. Id. at 1555-56.
132. Id. at 1556.
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"first impression for the federal appellate courts." 133
In resolving this issue, the court rejected the government's posi-
tion that any involvement by the secured lender in the management
of the facility destroys the Security Interest Exemption. 3 Also, it
rejected the position of Fleet that participation in day to day or oper-
ational management of the facility was required to destroy the Se-
curity Interest Exemption. 13 5 Instead, the court stated the rule of law
as follows:
Although similar, the phrase 'participating in management' and
the term 'operator' are not congruent. Under the standard we
adopt today, a secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2)
liability, without being an operator, by participating in the fi-
nancial management of a facility to a degree indicating a ca-
pacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor to actually
involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in or-
der to be liable - although such conduct will certainly lead to
loss of the protection of the statutory exemption. Nor is it neces-
sary for the secured creditor to participate in management deci-
sions relating to hazardous waste. Rather, a secured creditor
will be liable if its involvement with the management of the fa-
cility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could
affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose; we
therefore specifically reject the formulation of the secured credi-
tor exemption suggested by the district court in Mirabile." 6
Fleet Factors adopted a combined actual management/capacity
to influence test. In other words, the test can reasonably be inter-
preted to require some actual "involvement in management", al-
though that participation need not necessarily relate to the hazard-
ous waste practices of the borrower. If the threshold level of
managemement involvement by the lender exists, the lender will then
lose the Security Interest Exemption because its actual involvement
creates an inference that it could affect hazardous waste decisions if
it chose to do so. Secured lenders were justifiably alarmed by the
decision. Could a mere "capacity to influence" a borrower's affairs,
standing alone, be enough to serve as the basis for CERCLA
liability?
In the view of the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, the
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-58.
136. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted and emphasis added).
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actual management/capacity to influence test would promote the
purposes of CERCLA by encouraging a thorough investigation by
potential creditors. 137 In fact, the court stated that the test does not
"preclude a secured creditor from monitoring any aspect of a
debtor's business" and allows the lender to have involvement in "oc-
casional and discrete financial decisions relating to the protection of
its security interest." '88
In applying this new test, the court agreed with Fleet that it did
not have a sufficient degree of involvement during Phase I to lose the
exemption.139 Its activities during that period consisted of advancing
funds against the debtor's accounts receivable, paying and arranging
for payment of security deposits on state utility services to the debtor
and advising the debtor that it would not advance additional funds
when the unpaid advances would exceed the accounts receivable
balance.
The court disagreed with the U.S. District Court concerning
Phase II. The activities of Fleet during Phase II were sufficient par-
ticipation to destroy the exemption.1 40 During Phase II, Fleet Fac-
tors allegedly required the debtor to seek its approval before making
customer shipments, set the value of excess inventory, determined
the date and the destination of the shipment of finished goods, con-
trolled major personnel decisions including layoffs and employment
tax form processing, supervised the office administrator, controlled
access to the site and hired Baldwin as a liquidator.
The court agreed with the U.S. District Court that the activities
of Fleet during Phase III were enough to destroy the exemption. In
fact, the court said Fleet Factor's level of involvement during Phase
III would, if proven, rise to "operator" status."' This arguably ren-




Shortly following the Fleet Factors decision, secured creditors
received conflicting signals from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit, in delivering these signals, was
apparently not impressed by the drafting efforts of the legislators in
137. Id. at 1558.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1559.
140. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1559.
141. Id. at 1559-60.
142. Bergsoe Metal v. East Asiatic Co., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
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the enactment of CERCLA. As stated bythe court, CERCLA "pro-
vides that the 'owner' of a contaminated facility is liable for the costs
of cleanup. It is left for the courts, however, to clean up the mess left
behind by complicated financial transactions. We search for the
CERCLA owner."14 After concluding its search, the court deter-
mined that the "owner" in this particular case was not the lender.
A municipal corporation (the Port) in Oregon sold land (the
site) to a corporation (Bergsoe) to operate a lead recycling facility.
Subsequently, Bergsoe conveyed the site to the Port and leased the
site back from the Port with an option to purchase the site. The Port
then issued revenue bonds and mortgaged the site and assigned the
lease to United States National Bank of Oregon (U.S. Bank), as
trustee for the bondholders, in order to secure payment of the bonds.
Bergsoe experienced financial difficulties and, after declaration
of a default by U.S. Bank on the leases, entered into a workout
agreement providing for operation of the site by another corporation
(Front Street). U.S. Bank and the Port agreed, as part of this
workout, not to foreclose. Unfortunately, Front Street was unable to
run the operation successfully, Bergsoe was involuntarily placed into
bankruptcy by U.S. Bank, and the state of Oregon identified the
presence of hazardous substances on the site. U.S. Bank ultimately
commenced a proceeding to collect Bergsoe's obligation to the bond-
holders. That proceeding included a request for an order declaring
Bergsoe's shareholders liable for the cleanup costs. In turn, the de-
fendants in that proceeding asked for an order declaring U.S. Bank
and the Port liable for those costs.
The Port relied on the Security Interest Exemption in support of
its motion for summary judgment. First, the court reasoned that the
deed to the site was held by the Port for the purpose of ensuring that
Bergsoe would meet its financial obligations and, therefore, was a
security interest for purposes of CERCLA.144 Despite this conclu-
sion, the court recognized that the Port could be liable under CER-
CLA if it participated in management.14 5 In determining whether
the Port had participated, the court recognized Fleet Factors as the
sole appellate decision to have addressed this specific issue. 4 ' How-
ever, the court specifically declined the opportunity to formulate a
Ninth Circuit test for participation. The court reasoned that some
143. Id. at 669.
144. Id. at 671.
145. id. at 672.
146. Id.
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level of actual participation by the lender is necessary and that, since
there was no participation at all by the Port, it was not necessary to
determine where to draw the line. " 7
The court rejected the Port's assertion that its encouragement of
the building of the lead recycling facility and its negotiation with
Bergsoe concerning its decision to build the facility constituted par-
ticipation in management. The court stated that these activities did
not fall in the class of activities properly labeled as management.4 8
Most importantly, the court rejected Bergsoe's assertion that
rights reserved to the Port in the leases, but not actually exercised,
destroyed the exemption. The court did not consider this decision to
be in conflict with the Fleet Factors decision. In fact, the court
stated:
EAC generally errs in equating the power to manage with ac-
tual management. As did the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors,
we hold that a creditor must, as a threshold matter, exercise
actual management authority before it can be held liable for
action or inaction which results in the discharge of hazardous
wastes. Merely having the power to get involved in manage-
ment, but failing to exercise it, is not enough." "
Finally, the court rejected Bergsoe's assertion that the Port's in-
volvement in the decision to hire Front Street constituted participa-
tion by the Port. The court found no evidence of the Port's participa-
tion in the decision to hire. The court concluded that the Port was
not in a principal-agent relationship with U.S. Bank which would
make it responsible for the Bank's decisions150
At this point in time lenders faced two critical questions. Would
foreclosure, or its equivalent, void the Security Interest Exemption?
Would normal lender activities be enough participation in manage-
ment to void the Security Interest Exemption?
V. EPA Rule - Proposed (1991) and Final (1992)
Largely in response to the confusion and furor created by the
Fleet Factors decision,15' the EPA began work in 1990 on an admin-
147. Bergsoe Metal, 910 F.2d at 672.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 673 n.3 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 673.
151. See the statement of the EPA concerning the backgroand for the Final EPA Rule.
57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,345 (1992); and Howard and Gerard, supra note 2, at 1188 (discuss-
ing the "mixed signals" sent to lenders by Congress, the EPA and the courts, the authors state
that Fleet Factors "has triggered a flurry of negative reactions and has led to efforts by Con-
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istrative rule to clarify the scope of the Security Interest Exemption.
A draft of that rule was sent by the EPA to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) in September of 1990. Subsequently,
OMB returned the draft rule to the EPA for revision. 152 A draft of a
revised rule was then published by private sources in February
1991.153 The proposed rule (the Proposed EPA Rule) was officially
Published in June 1991,154 and the Final EPA Rule was published in
April 1992.155
The Final EPA Rule is structured as a revision of the National
Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan.156 The apparent
intent of the EPA in adopting this approach was to create a legal
argument that the Final EPA Rule is binding, not only in actions
commenced by the federal government, but in actions commenced by
gress and, to and extent, the EPA to limit or reverse the decision").
152. EPA's Draft Says Creditors Using Standard Practices Exempt From Liability,
BNA's Banking Rept., Feb. 25, 1991, at 334.
153. Draft EPA Proposal on Lender Liability Under CERCLA Obtained by BNA on
Feb. 14, 1991, BNA's BANKING REP., Feb. 25, 1991, at 370 (containing the text of the draft
as it then existed).
154. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (proposed June 24, 1991) [hereinafter the Proposed
EPA Rule]. The text of the proposed rule was published in BNA's Banking Report. EPA
Proposal to Limit Liability of Financial Institutions Under CERCLA, BNA's BANKING
REPT., June 10, 1991, at 1104. See generally Sitomer, Fleet Factors Decision Haunts Banks
No More, BANKERS MAG., Jan./Feb. 1992, at 63; Sellinger and Chapman, EPA's Proposed
Rule on Lender Liability Under CERCLA: No Panacea for the Financial Services Industry,
21 E.L.R. 10618 (1991); Scranton, Issues in Lending. . .How the Proposed EPA Rule Affects
Lender Liability, J. OF COM. BANK LENDING, Oct. 1991, at 18; O'Brien and Nooney, supra
note 7; Cope, EPA Proposal Would Protect Banks From Cleanup Liability, AM. BANKER,
June 6, 1991, at 2; Wolf, EPA's Lender Liability Rule: No Surprises But More Work
Needed, 21 E.L.R. 1006 (1991); and Miano, Part 1: Providing Lenders With Superfund Re-
lief, Mergers and Acquisitions, July/Aug. 1991, at 28. In addition to addressing the scope of
the security interest exemption, the Proposed EPA Rule addressed the liability under CER-
CLA of governmental entities that involuntarily acquire property contaminated by hazardous
substances. That issue is beyond the scope of this article.
155. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 300, Subpart L) (pub-
lished Apr. 29, 1992) See generally Copple and Stern, Lender Liability Rule Leaves Ques-
tions, AM. BANKER, July 7, 1992, at 4; Nielsen, "Traditional" Banking Will Not Lead to
Superfund Liability, Says EPA, MAG. OF BANK MGMT., June 1992, at 20; Robb and Sotto,
EPA's Rule Provides Map to a Minefield, AM. BANKER, June 30, 1992, at 4 (in which the
title is, perhaps, the slip of a pen properly referring to a map through a minefield );O'Brien
and Gibson, Final EPA Rule Allows Traditional Lender Activities Without Superfund Liabil-
ities, BNA ENV'T REP., May 15, 1992, at 326; and Hathaway, EPA Final Rule on Lender
Liability Under CERCLA, Toxics L. REP., Apr. 29, 1992, at 1466; EPA Sets Two Pronged
Test for Lenders to Determine Participation in Management, THE MORTGAGE MARKET-
PLACE, May 11, 1992, at 4; and Margaret V. Hathaway, EPA Rule on Lender Liability Under
Federal Superfund Law, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 6, 1992. The Final EPA Rule has al-
ready been challenged in federal court. See EPA Lender Liability Rule Challenged in D.C.
Circuit, ABA Plans to Intervene, 59 BNA's BANKING REP. 218 (Aug. 10, 1992) (Michigan's
attorney general claims that "the EPA went beyond a mere interpretation of the statute by
creating exemptions for secured creditors, and also charged the rule will encourage banks to
begin operating contaminated facilities).
156. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,382 (1992).
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private parties as well.157 Despite this approach, it remains unclear
whether, and to what extent, courts will consider the Final EPA
Rule to be binding in actions commenced by private parties.158 Even
in an action by the federal government, it is not certain that courts
will find the administrative interpretation of the Security Interest
Exemption embodied in the Final EPA Rule to be persuasive.1 59
In addition to the uncertainties surrounding the application of
the Final EPA Rule to private party plaintiffs and its binding power,
the rule leaves a number of significant gaps in coverage. 160 For ex-
ample, many financial institutions acquire interests in property in a
fiduciary capacity. The Final EPA Rule does not apply to the poten-
tial liability of financial institutions in that arena. 6' Nor does the
Final EPA Rule apply to unsecured creditors.' Also, lenders have
potential environmental liability exposure under many laws other
157. Id. at 18,368.
158. EPA Official Says Secured Lenders Should Look Ahead to Third Party Actions,
BNA's BANKING REP., Aug. 19, 1991, at 309. See the commentary of the EPA on the Final
EPA Rule in which the EPA makes reference to the numerous comments received on the
Proposed EPA Rule questioning whether that rule would apply to private party litigation. 57
Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,368 (1992).
159. It is the position of the EPA that the Final EPA rule is a "legislative" or "substan-
tive" rule as opposed to an "interpretive" rule. In addition, the EPA argues that, even were the
Final EPA rule deemed to be interpretive, it would be entitled to substantial deference in the
process of judicial review. However, the EPA pointed out in its commentary to the Final EPA
rule that commenters had taken the position that the rule would not be binding on the courts.
57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,368 (1992). See Hathaway, EPA Rule on Lender Liability Under the
Federal Superfund Law, supra note 155 (pointing out that the Final EPA Rule will likely be
challenged in court in the near future).
160. See generally Banks, Bankers Still Need Protection From Environmental Risk,
Expert Says, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 26, 1992; Robb and Sotto, supra note 155 (laws
other than CERCLA still a risk); Legislative Protection for Lenders Still Needed After EPA
CERCLA Rule, BNA's BANKING REP., May 18, 1992, at 872 (liability under RCRA and
fiduciary liability still risks); O'Brien and Gibson, supra note 155 (third parties may not be
bound, RCRA and state statutes not covered, unsecured creditors and fiduciaries not pro-
tected);and Hathaway, EPA Rule on Lender Liability Under the Federal Superfund Law,
supra note 155 (proceedings in progress may not be covered, liability under other federal laws
not addressed and fiduciaries and unsecured creditors not protected).
161. 57 Fed. Reg. 18344, 18,349 (1992). In its commentary to the Final EPA Rule, the
EPA takes the position that there is no statutory basis for treating fiduciary liability as part of
the rule. However, the EPA states in that commentary that innocent fiduciaries are not gener-
ally liable under CERCLA. Id. at 18,349. See generally New EPA Proposal Won't Shelve
Lender Liability Legislation, BANKING POL'Y REP., July 1, 1991, at 4 (commenting on this
gap in coverage in the Proposed EPA Rule); Adams, Environmental Hazards for Fiduciaries:
An Acid Test, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, Jan. 1992, at 24; Ries and Christel, Fiduciary Liability
on the Rise: Bankers Can Prevent Liability in the Face of Increasing Litigation, MAG. OF
BANK MGMT., June 1991, at 25; and Colleen Johnson, Bankers Beware of Pollution Liability:
Expert, Bus. INS., Feb. 11, 1991, at 15. But see Fiduciary Not Liable As Owner Under CER-
CLA, Federal Judge Holds, 59 BNA's BANKING REG., 544 (Oct. 12, 1992) (federal district
court judge rules that bank trustee of contaminated realty, without other incidents of owner-
ship, is not liable as owner under CERCLA).
162. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992).
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than CERCLA.'13 The Final EPA Rule does not apply to Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) liability or to any other
source of liability other than CERCLA."6 4 Furthermore, the Final
EPA Rule does not spell out in detail what affirmative duties, if any,
the law places upon a lender to assure that cleanup of a hazardous
substance spill takes place. Although the commentary to the Final
EPA Rule does state that a lender is "not expected to be an insurer
or guarantor of environmental safety or quality,"'6 5 it does not spec-
ify what affirmative duties, if any, the law places upon the secured
lender at the various stages of the lending process.' 6 As a result,
federal legislation is needed to plug these significant gaps despite the
finalization of the EPA rule." 7
Although these gaps are significant, the Final EPA Rule does
provide substantial guidance for lenders and, in most respects, is a
significant improvement over the Proposed EPA Rule. 68 The Final
EPA Rule's coverage is extremely broad. Although the courts and
commentators have discussed the different applications of the Secur-
ity Interest Exemption in "lien theory" and "title theory" jurisdic-
tions,6 9 the commentary to the Final EPA Rule expressly recognizes
that the rule will be applied in the same manner in both "lien the-
ory" and "title theory" jurisdictions. 7 Similarly, the Final EPA
Rule covers virtually all methods used by lenders to secure loans.
The Final EPA Rule focuses on the lender's motivation in determin-
ing whether the particular method chosen by the lender falls within
the scope of the Security Interest Exemption. The lender's primary
motivation must be to protect its security interest in order to be
within the scope of the Security Interest Exemption. 7 1 This "func-
tional transactional" approach includes lenders nominally holding a
163. See supra note 42.
164. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,349-351 (1992). E.g., Bank Witnesses Endorse Legislation
Over EPA Rule to Address Lender CERCLA Liability, BNA's BANKING REP., June 17, 1991,
at 1132.
165. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,377 (1992).
166. E.g., James Dabney Miller and Kerrie S. Covell, EPA's Lender Liability Rule
Needs Polishing, AM. BANKER, Apr. 12, 1991, at 4.
167. Legislative Protection For Lenders Still Needed After EPA CERCLA Rule, supra
note 160; Sellinger and Chapman, supra note 154.
168. Banks Should Be Encouraged to Lend on Contaminated Property, Expert Says, 59
BNA's BANKING REP. 608 (Oct. 26, 1992); Nielsen, supra note 155 (banker concerns should
"ease significantly"); O'Brien and Gibson, supra note 155 ("significant step for the lending
community").
169. E.g., Note, Clean Up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CER-
CLA'a Security Interest Exemption, supra note 25 at 1258.
170. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,352 (1992).
171. Id. at 18,344-345.
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lessee's interest, guarantors and subsequent holders. 172
The fact that the Final EPA Rule makes a significant improve-
ment in the law does not end the matter, however. Lenders are risk
averse and any significant uncertainties in the law will act as a de-
terrent to normal lending activities. It is, therefore, necessary to re-
view the application of the Final EPA Rule at the various stages of
the normal lending process to determine at which stage the rule is
likely to create legal uncertainties. That analysis is presented below.
A. Lender Activities Before the Loan
Activities of the lender before it acquires an indicia of owner-
ship in the property are, according to the EPA explanation of its
Final EPA Rule, "irrelevant"' 171 for purposes of the Security Interest
Exemption.' 7 ' The "irrelevant" language used by the EPA in its ex-
planation of the Final EPA Rule is even stronger than that used in
the Proposed EPA Rule.
175
An example of a common pre-loan practice is the use of envi-
ronmental audits. In the last several years, many lenders have
adopted the advice of numerous commentators and now require envi-
ronmental audits before making environmentally sensitive loans as a
-means of managing the potential for CERCLA liability. 7 The Final
EPA Rule recognizes that, since these audits pre-date the prospec-
tive lender's acquisition of an indicia of ownership in the facility,
they simply have no bearing on the availability of the Security Inter-
est Exemption. 77 Specifically, neither the failure to obtain an audit
nor the act of obtaining or requiring an audit may be used against a
lender asserting the availability of the Security Interest Exemp-
tion. 178 Similarly, requiring the prospective borrower to clean up the
property based on information revealed by the audit is not evidence
of participation in management by the lender.1 79 In this respect, the
Final EPA Rule language is, again, broader than the language in the
172. Id. at 18,375.
173. 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,376.
174. Id. at 18,383 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec. 300.1 100(c)(2)(i)).
175. Compare the explanation of the Proposed EPA Rule concerning lenders activities
in connection with the loan application. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803 (1992) (in which the
EPA stated that these activities were not evidence of participation in management).
176. E.g., Lenders Get Advice on CRA Compliance, Environmental Liability Avoid-
ance, BNA's BANKING REPT., July 1, 1991, at 7; Johnson, supra note 161; Schnapf, supra
note 11; Beutelschies, supra note 23; and Rowley and Witmer, supra note 23.
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Proposed EPA Rule in that it specifically permits the lender to re-
main within the scope of the Security Interest Exemption whether
this activity is required "prior to or subsequent to the time that indi-
cia of ownership are held.
180
Despite the EPA's clarification that pre-loan activities are irrel-
evant for purposes of the Security Interest Exemption, the EPA
commentary on the Final EPA Rule does recognize the advisability
of these environmental audits for other reasons. Specifically, it recog-
nizes that availability of the Innocent Landowner Defense may de-
pend, in part, on whether the lender acquired an appropriate envi-
ronmental audit.1
81
There are significant differences in this respect between the Fi-
nal EPA Rule and the draft which circulated in early 1991. The
earlier draft attempted to meld the Innocent Purchaser Defense and
the Security Interest Exemption in connection with the use of envi-
ronmental audits. The earlier draft recognized the need to inquire
into previous ownerships and uses of the site in order to qualify for
the Innocent Landowner Defense. It provided that a lender requiring
an audit would create evidence of a "highly probative" nature in
determining the availability of the Security Interest Exemption. 
1 2
The Final EPA Rule, in contrast, recognizes that CERCLA itself
draws no such direct connection between the Innocent Landowner
Defense and the Security Interest Exemption.' 8" This appears to be a
valid legal conclusion by the EPA. However, the practice of requir-
ing environmental audits in appropriate cases is sound from a policy
standpoint and should be encouraged. Therefore corrective federal
legislation should require the agencies supervising lenders to adopt
standards to define the circumstances under which these audits are
required. Lenders meeting those standards should then be placed
within a safe harbor for purposes of the Innocent Landowner
defense.
B. General Participation in Management Test
The most significant change from the Proposed EPA Rule to the
180. Compare the provisions of the Proposed EPA Rule. 56 Fed. Reg. 28, 798, 28,809
(1991). In both the Proposed EPA Rule and the Final EPA Rule, this provision is contained in
the section of the rule dealing with actions of the lender at the inception of the loan. However,
the provisions in the Final EPA Rule parenthetically refer to such actions subsequent to that
time although such parenthetical reference would logically fit in a later portion of the rule.
181. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,353 (1992).
182. Draft EPA Proposal on Lender Liability Under CERCLA Obtained by BNA Feb.
14, 1991, supra note 153.
183. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,353 (1992).
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Final EPA Rule is the articulation by the EPA of the test (the Gen-
eral Test) for determining whether a lender has participated in man-
agement. 18' Both the Proposed EPA Rule version and the Final EPA
Rule version are two-pronged tests which expressly reject the Fleet
Factors "capacity to influence" standard. 18 5 The significant differ-
ences are:
1. The first prongs of both tests address the lender's decision
making control over the borrower's environmental law compliance
activities. The Final EPA Rule rejects its predecessor's approach
which would have required that the lender's control have actually
resulted in a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
in order to constitute participation in management by the lender; 18
2. The second prong of the Final EPA Rule is broken down into
two subparts to close a perceived loophole in the Proposed EPA
Rule. Specifically, a lender under the General Test in the Proposed
EPA Rule could "carve-out" in its loan documentation any power to
control it's borrower's environmental compliance and, by so doing,
avoid the application of the General Test. 187 The Final EPA Rule
avoids this problem by applying the second prong of the General
Test. The second prong focuses on whether the lender (i) takes day-
to-day control of environmental compliance of the borrow or (ii)
takes day-to-day control of the operational aspects of the borrower's
business. 8 For this purpose, operational aspects of the borrower's
business specifically exclude financial and administrative aspects.'89
184. Compare the test as articulated in the Proposed EPA Rule at 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798,
28,809 (1991) with the test under the Final EPA Rule at 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,383 (1992)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec. 300.1100(c)(1)).
185. Compare the EPA explanations of the provisions of the Proposed EPA Rule at 56
Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803 (1991) with those of the Final EPA Rule at 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344,
18,379-380 (1992).
186. Compare the provisions of the Proposed EPA Rule at 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809
(1991) with the provisions of the Final EPA Rule at 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,383 (1992) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec 300.1 100(c)(1)(i)). See the EPA's explanation of this change at
57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,359 (1992).
187. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809 (1991). See the EPA explanation of the elimination of
this "carve out" potential at 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,360 (1992).
188. Id. at 18,383 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec. 300.1 100(l)(ii)(A)and(B)).
189. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,383 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec.
300.1100(c)(1)(ii)(B). The operational aspects of the borrower's business include functions
commonly handled by a plant manager, an operations manager, a chief operating officer or a
chief executive officer. The financial or administrative aspects of the borrower's business (in
which the lender may participate without abandoning the benefits of the Security Interest
Exemption) include, in contrast, functions commonly handled by a credit manager, an ac-
counts payable/receivables manager, a personnel manager, a controller or a chief financial
officer. Id.
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C. Loan Documentation
In addition to environmental audits, many commentators have
suggested that lenders include various restrictive covenants in their
loan documents in order to reduce potential CERCLA liability. 190
The Final EPA Rule provides that the inclusion of provisions are of
this type are not to be considered evidence of management participa-
tion by the lender.19 As examples of permissible provisions, the Fi-
nal EPA Rule endorses the following: a contractual duty of the bor-
rower to clean up hazardous substances on the property;. an
assurance of continuing compliance by the borrower with environ-
mental laws; permission for periodic monitoring and inspection by
the lender of the borrower's property; and permission to monitor and
inspect the debtor's business and financial condition.192
These contractual provisions, now specifically permitted by the
Final EPA Rule, are the type of provisions which many commenta-
tors had correctly identified as potentially running afoul of the Fleet
Factors "capacity to influence" test.193 However, the EPA commen-
tary states that the position taken by the Final EPA Rule is consis-
tent with Fleet Factors. The commentary states that ". . . this final
rule does not administratively overturn or overrule Fleet Factors
." because that decision did not hold that a mere capacity to in-
fluence voided the Security Interest Exemption.194 Despite this posi-
tion of the EPA, lenders should remain concerned that a court will
ultimately find that the EPA has misread the Security Interest Ex-
emption and Fleet Factors and hold the Final EPA Rule to be an
invalid interpretive administrative rule.
In addition to discussing the impact of contractual provisions
upon the Security Interest Exemption, the commentary to the Final
EPA Rule states the position of the EPA that the lender is not "ex-
pected to be an insurer or guarantor of environmental safety at a
facility in which it has a security interest." 195 Since the EPA's posi-
tion refers only to liability under CERCLA and not to liability under
contractual or tort theories that may exist (such as aiding and abet-
ting), 96 lenders will continue to be concerned about inclusion of
190. E.g, Davidson, supra note 23; Smith, supra note 19.
191. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,356, 18,377, 18,383 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
sec. 300.1 100(c)(2)(ii)).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Grady, supra note 23.
194. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,369 (1992).
195. See supra note 165.
196. See supra note 24.
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such provisions in their loan documents because those provisions may
appear to place otherwise nonexistent affirmative duties on the
lender.
D. Policing and Workout
The Final EPA Rule broadly endorses many policing and
workout activities commonly undertaken by lenders in connection
with the administration of a loan prior to default as well as in con-
nection with the borrower's default or anticipated default.
197
1. Policing.-A significant change from the approach taken by
the Proposed EPA Rule is found in the provisions of the Final EPA
Rule's provisions concerning policing of the loan. The section of the
Proposed EPA Rule entitled "Policing the Security Interest or
Loan" stated, "Actions that are consistent with protecting a security
interest do not constitute participation in management for purposes
of section 101(20)(a) of CERCLA."'"9 The Proposed EPA Rule
then provided a list of lending activities which were specifically in-
cluded on that list. 9 9 Lending activities specifically described on
that list appeared to fall within a safe harbor.
In contrast, the section of the Final EPA Rule entitled "Policing
the Security Interest or Loan" states, "A holder who engages in po-
licing activities prior to foreclosure will remain within the exemption
provided that the holder does not by such actions participate in man-
agement of the vessel or facility as provided in 40 C.F.R.
300.1100(c)(1)."2 °° The Final EPA Rule then provides a list of ac-
tivities which may be included on that list (i.e., as long as the Gen-
eral Test is satisfied)."0 1 This language difference is critical. This
section is not structured as a safe harbor for lenders engaging in one
of the specifically listed activities as appeared to be the case under
the Proposed EPA Rule. Even if an activity is specifically listed, it
must still satisfy the General Test in order for the Security Interest
Exemption to be available.
2. Workout.-Another significant change from the Proposed
EPA Rule is contained in the workout provisions of the Final EPA
197. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,383 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec.
300.1 100(c)(2)(ii)).
198. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809 (1991).
199. Id.
200. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,383 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec.
300.1 100(c)(2)(ii)(A)).
201. Id.
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Rule. The Proposed EPA Rule would have required that the activi-
ties of the lender be limited to those necessary to "protect and pre-
serve the security interest in an effort to prevent default . . . or the
diminution in value of the security."2 02 The Final EPA now defines
the term "workout" and the definition includes prevention, cure and
mitigation of default and the protection and preservation of the value
of the security."' The Final Rule specifically sanctions these activi-
ties "at any time prior to foreclosure." 04 Furthermore, the Final
EPA Rule expands the non-exclusive list of examples of permissible
workout activities beyond the list contained in the Proposed EPA
Rule.2 05 As an example of the increased coverage of the Final EPA
Rule, the Proposed EPA Rule referred only to "financial advice" '206
whereas the Final EPA Rule refers to "financial or other advice."'207
E. Good Samaritan Provisions
The Proposed EPA Rule did not specifically refer to the so-
called Good Samaritan Provisions of CERCLA. 0 8 The Final EPA
Rule specifically permits these actions.209 In fact, it carves those ac-
tivities out of the General Test.210 In other words, a lender who takes
appropriate response action under 107(d)(1) of CERCLA is not
deemed to participate in management even though that action would
otherwise run afoul of the General Test.
F. Foreclosure
The Final EPA Rule takes the position that the acquisition of
title to the contaminated property by the lender in connection with
foreclosure (or an equivalent of foreclosure) does not automatically
void the Security Interest Exemption.2 11 For example, a lender who
202. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809 (1991).
203. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,383 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec.
300.1100(c)(2)(ii)(B)).
204. Id.
205. Compare the list of permissible activities in the Proposed EPA Rule at 56 Fed.
Reg. 28,798, 28,809 (1991) with the list of permissible activities in the Final EPA Rule at 56
Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18383 (1992).
206. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809 (1991).
207. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,383 (1992).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (1988).
209. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,383 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec.
300.1100(c)(2)(iii)).
210. Id.
211. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,360-362, 18,377-379, 18,383 (1992) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. sec. 300.1 100(d)(1)). The Final EPA Rule also contemplates the possibility that the
lender could reap a windfall if the EPA conducted a response action while the lender held an
interest in the property. Therefore, the EPA commentary on the Final EPA Rule indicates
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purchases the property at the foreclosure sale or who accepts a deed
in lieu of foreclosure may still retain the benefit of the Security In-
terest Exemption.212 This pronouncement by the EPA is another rea-
son why lenders remain concerned about the validity of the Final
EPA Rule. A court may find this provision to be an invalid adminis-
trative interpretation of CERCLA.21 a
Although title acquisition does not automatically void the Se-
curity Interest Exemption, the Final EPA Rule does require that the
lender's post-foreclosure activities demonstrate that the lender is
holding the property primarily to protect its security interest as op-
posed to acting as an investor.21 Therefore, the "General Post-Fore-
closure Test" in the Final EPA Rule requires that the lender at-
tempt to divest itself of the property in a "reasonably expeditious
manner" using "whatever commercially reasonable means are rele-
vant or appropriate" after all facts and circumstances of the particu-
lar transaction are taken into account. 21 5 This General Post-Foreclo-
sure Test does not, however, permit a lender who participated in the
management of its debtor prior to acquisition of title to bootstrap
itself into the Security Interest Exemption through foreclosure. 16
The adoption of this General Post-Foreclosure Test in the Final
EPA Rule adds significant protection for lenders beyond the protec-
tion provided by the Proposed EPA Rule. Specifically:
1. Under the proposed EPA Rule the lender was required to
list the property with a broker, dealer or agent dealing in prop-
erty of that type and to begin advertising the property in a spe-
cific manner (as set out in the Proposed EPA Rule) within
twelve months following foreclosure.2 17 However, failure to com-
ply with that specific process as outlined by the Proposed EPA
Rule would have resulted in a loss of the Security Interest Ex-
emption even if another process made better business sense for
that the EPA will assert a lien upon the property in that instance and seek equitable reim-
bursement from the lender. However, the EPA specifically answered concerns of commentators
on the Proposed EPA Rule by stating this lien will not be treated as a "superlien." 57 Fed.
Reg. 18,344, 18,368 (1992).
212. Id.
213. The EPA commentary on the Final EPA Rule noted that a significant number of
commentators on the rule had disagreed with the EPA's position that acquisition of ownership
by the lender does not necessarily cause loss of the benefits of the Security Interest Exemption.
The EPA responded by saying that "[tihe holding of Maryland Bank & Trust, is therefore,
consistent with allowing foreclosure under certain circumstances without voiding the exemp-
tion." 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,361 (1992).
214. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,384 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 300.1100(d)(1)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809 (1991).
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that particular property.21 8 In contrast, the Final EPA Rule sets
up that twelve month period as a bright line through the Bright
Line Post Foreclosure Test. If the lender fails to fall within that
bright line, it may still satisfy the General Post-Foreclosure
Test;219
2. The method of computing the twelve month period under
the Bright Line Post-Foreclosure Test is improved. The period
does not, as under the Proposed EPA Rule, commence upon the
date of foreclosure. 22 0 That period commences, instead, upon the
date on which the lender acquires marketable title.
21
3. Whether the lender relies upon General Post-Foreclosure
Test or the Bright Line Post-Foreclosure Test, the Final EPA
Rule requires that the lender act promptly upon certain offers to
purchase the property. Beginning six months after the lender's
acquisition of marketable title, the lender may not fail to act
upon (within ninety days of receipt), outbid or reject a written,
bona fide, firm offer of full consideration for the property.222
However, the Final EPA Rule is far more specific than the Pro-
posed EPA Rule concerning the types of offers triggering this
ninety day rule.222 The Final EPA Rule, in its definition of
"written, bona fide, firm offer" retained the requirements of the
Proposed EPA Rule that the offer be legally enforceable, con-
tain all material terms and be made by a ready and willing pur-
chaser demonstrating to the lender's satisfaction its ability to
perform. However, the Final EPA Rule added requirements that
the offer be for cash and solely for the property in question. 224
4. Fair consideration is, additionally, defined by the Final
EPA Rule in a manner far more favorable to lenders than the
definition found in the Proposed EPA Rule. As in the Proposed
EPA Rule, the definition is based on the debt owing rather than
218. Id.
219. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,384 (1992). See the provision of the Final EPA Rule to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. sec. 300.1100(d)(l) containing the General Post-Foreclosure Test and
the provisions of the Final EPA Rule to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec. 300.1100(d)(2)(i) con-
taining the Bright Line Post-Foreclosure Test.
220. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809 (1991).
221. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,384 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec.
300.1 100(d)(2)(i)). Note that the Proposed EPA Rule would have required the advertising to
begin within the twelve month period. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809 (1991). In contrast, the
Final EPA Rule's Bright Line Post-Foreclosure Test apparently requires the advertising to be
undertaken continuously throughout that period. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,384 (1992).
222. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,384 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec.
300.1100(d)(1) and (2)(ii)).
223. Compare the provisions of the Proposed EPA Rule at 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809
(1991) with those of the Final EPA Rule at 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,384 (1992).
224. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,384 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec.
300.1100(d)(2)(ii)(B)).
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upon fair market value.22 5 However, the Final EPA Rule recog-
nizes that fair market value may vary based upon the lender's
priority.2 26 Also, the Final EPA Rule recognizes that a lender
may be required by law to reject bids which would otherwise
qualify as offers for fair consideration in order to avoid
liability.
2 27
5. The Final EPA Rule specifically authorizes the lender to
maintain the business activities of the borrower after the lender
acquires title.22 8 However, the Final EPA Rule does emphasize
that this applies only to the Security Interest Exemption. The
lender could become liable as an Arranger on Transporter of
hazardous substances by virtue of those same activities. 229
G. Retroactive Application
The Final EPA Rule became effective on April 29, 1992.230 The
EPA commentary on the Final EPA Rule states that the EPA ex-
pects that its provisions will provide guidance in evaluation of actions
taken prior to the effective date.231 Once again, it is uncertain
whether a court, even if accepting the validity of the Final EPA
Rule, would apply it retroactively.
H. Burden of Proof
The Proposed EPA Rule appeared to require a plaintiff to bear
the burden of proving that a lender was not entitled to the Security
Interest Exemption.23 2 The Final EPA Rule recognizes the question-
able legal basis for that approach. 233 Although the Final EPA Rule
retains the language from the Proposed EPA Rule with minor modi-
fications,234 the EPA commentary to the Final EPA Rule recognizes
225. Compare the definition found in the Proposed EPA Rule at 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798,
28,809 (1991) with the Final EPA Rule definition at 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,834 (1992) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec. 300.1100(d)(2)(A)).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,384 (1992) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. sec.
300.1 100(d)(2)).
229. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,384 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. sec.
300.1 100(d)(3)).
230. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,374 (1992).
231. Id.
232. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,808 (1991) ("If a defendant claims the exemption the
plaintiff had the burden of establishing that the defendant is the owner or operator as provided
in this regulation.")
233. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,367 (1992).
234. Id. at 18,382 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.-sec. 300.1100) ("The plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that the defendant is liable as an owner or operator.").
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that the EPA cannot shift the burdens of proof by administrative
fiat. 36
VI. Pending Federal Legislation
Four federal legislative proposals were introduced in 1991 into
Congress in 1991 to deal with the above discussed uncertainty in the
Security Interest Exemption." 8 Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) intro-
duced into the Senate the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvements
Act on March 13, 1991. The Act contained a proposal to amend
federal laws imposing strict liability for the release or threatened re-
lease of hazardous substances (the Garn Proposal). 37 On March 14,
1992, Representative John La Falce introduced into the House of
Representatives a bill to amend CERCLA and the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act of 1976 (the La Falce Proposal).23 8 On
March 22, 1991, Representative Wayne Owens introduced into the
House of Representatives a proposal to amend CERCLA designated
as the Superfund Liability Clarification Act (the Owens Propo-
sal). 239 Finally, as part of a comprehensive banking bill, the U.S.
Senate passed the Asset Conservation and Deposit Insurance Protec-
tion Act of 1991 (the 1991 Senate Proposal). 240 However, the 1991
Senate Proposal was deleted by the Conference Report 24' and did
not become part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991.242
235. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,367 (1992).
236. See generally Tupi and Nicholson, Legislation to Restore CERCLA's Security In-
terest Exemption: Which Bill Should Lender's Support?, Toxics L. REP., July 3, 1991, at 161
(arguing that only the proposal of Rep. John La Face is acceptable); and Hathaway, Federal
Legislation on Lender Environmental Liability: Last Chance Before Shootout at CERCLA
Corral, Toxics L. REP., Apr. 22, 1992, at 1434 (stating that "prospects for a 1992 enactment
of the Garn or La Falce legislation, or some variation thereof, are uncertain" and that, if not
enacted in 1992, are minimal until 1994 or 1995). 1991 was not the first time that such pro-
posals were made. See Berz and Gillon, supra note 25 (summarizing the earlier legislative
proposals). Note also that state legislatures have recently considered similar issues. E.g., Illi-
nois Bill Reduces Environmental Liability for Lenders, Purchasers, BNA BANKING DAILY,
July 6, 1992; New California Law Helps Lenders With Mortgages On Polluted Land, BNA's
BANKING REP., Nov. 18, 1991, at 802; New Missouri Law Curtailing Lenders' Liability for
Contamination Takes Effect, BNA's BANKING REP., Sept. 9, 1991, at 364; and Andrews,
Legislators Aim to Protect Lenders From Environmental Liabilities, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J.,
Feb. 25, 1991, sec. 1, at 9A.
237. S. 651, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 152 (1991). See the discussion of this proposal in
Howard and Gerard, supra note 2 at 1208-13 and in Scranton, supra note 154 at 27.
238. H.R. 1450, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See the discussion of this proposal in
Howard and Gerard, supra note 2 at 1213-14 and in Scranton, supra note 154 at 26-7.
239. H.R. 1643, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See the discussion of this proposal in
Scranton supra note 154 at 27-28.
240. S. 543, 102nd Cong., 1 st Sess., Title X (1991).
241. H. Rep. No. 102-406, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
242. P.L. 102-242, 102nd Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991). See generally Did Lender Liability
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The 1991 Senate Proposal was originally based on the Garn
Proposal.' 4" As it was passed by the Senate, however, the Garn Pro-
posal was significantly changed. The 1991 Senate Proposal applied
only to liability under CERCLA, not to liability under all federal
environmental laws imposing strict liability.
244
Already in 1992, another legislative proposal 245 dealing with the
issue of secured lender liability under federal environmental laws has
been introduced. On June 2, 1992 Senator Dole and Senator Garn
introduced the Community Bank Regulatory Relief Act of 1992.246
Title II of that legislative proposal would enact the Asset Conserva-
tion and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1992.241 This proposal
is substantially the same as the above-discussed 1991 Senate
Proposal.248
The Garn Proposal would limit but not eliminate the liability of
certain lenders,2" 9 specifically "insured depository institutions"
250
and "mortgage lenders." 251' This limitation on liability would apply,
not only to CERCLA, but to "any federal law imposing strict liabil-
ity for the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance. "252
In the case of an "insured depository institution," the limitation
would apply to property acquired by foreclosure, to property held in
a fiduciary capacity, to property held by a lessor pursuant to the
Bill Make Some Progress This Year? BANK LETTER, Dec. 16, 1991, at 6, Banking Bill Pro-
duces Many Winners, Losers, BANK LETTER, Dec. 9, 1991, at 2; and Senate-Passed Lender
Liability Title Would Amend CERCLA to Protect Bankers, BNA's BANKING REPT., Dec. 2,
1991, at 883 (all reporting on the conference committee process which led to the exclusion of
the lender liability provisions from the final 1991 banking bill).
243. See Title X of the version of S. 543 engrossed in the Senate on Oct. 4, 1991 (Ver-
sion 2). See generally Lender Liability Resolution May Survive Banking Bill; Protection
From Cleanup Costs Sought, THE MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE, Nov. 22, 1991, at I (summa-
rizing this proposal).
244. See Title X of the version of S. 543 engrossed in the Senate on Nov. 24, 1991
(Version 4). See generally Senate-Passed Lender Liability Title Would Amend CERCLA to
Protect Bankers, BNA BANKING DAILY, Nov. 26, 1991 (summarizing title X of S. 543).
245. The likelihood of legislation passing this year is far from certain. As stated in a
recent article, "Although lobbyists expect Sen. Jake Garn, R-Utah, the ranking members of
the Senate Banking Committee to press for lender liability legislation in the next session of
Congress, a meaningful legislative change might have to wait until 1994, when the Superfund
law is due for reauthorization." Kleege, Lenders Seeking Ways to East Rain of Cleanup Lia-
bility, supra note 23. Congress Sidesteps Many Banking Issues, But Acts on Mainly Techni-
cal Ones, II BANKING POL. REP. 2 (Oct. 19, 1992) (Although environmental liability relief for
lenders and trustees "was alive until the final weeks," it was not enacted in 1992).
246. S. 2794, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992).
247. Id. §§ 201-202.
248. Compare the proposal described supra note 242.
249. S. 651, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 36(a)(1)-(2).
250. Id. § 36(h)(5).
251. Id. § 36(h)(2).
252. Id. § 36(a)(1)-(2). See the definition of"hazardous substance." Id. § 36(h)(9); and
the definition of "release." Id. § 36(h)(8).
/
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terms of an extension of credit and to property subject to financial
control or oversight pursuant to the terms of a credit extension. 53 If
the limitation in the Garn Proposal were applicable in a particular
situation, the maximum liability exposure of the insured institution
would be the "actual benefit conferred on such institution by a re-
moval, remedial or other response action undertaken by another
party. ' 54
In addition to this general limit upon the liability of covered
lenders, the Garn Proposal would effectively reverse the result of the
Fleet Factors "capacity to influence" test. The Fleet Factors test
provides that liability may not be based solely on the unexercised
capacity to influence.
255
The liability limitations in the Garn Proposal would not be ab-
solute. The lender would lose the protection of these limitations in
three situations: 1) if the lender caused or contributed to the release
of the hazardous substance; 2) if, after acquiring the property
through foreclosure or termination of the lease, the lender failed to
take reasonable steps to prevent the continued release of a hazardous
substance after discovering the release; or 3) if the lender actively
directed or conducted operations that resulted in the hazardous sub-
stance release. 50
The only situation in which the Garn Proposal would entirely
eliminate liability which exists under current law is when that liabil-
ity would otherwise be based solely on a Fleet Factors capacity to
influence analysis. In other situations, the liability is simply limited
in amount. Furthermore, that limitation of the amount of liability
could be lost if any of the exceptions in the Garn Proposal applied.
For example, a secured lender who has "participated in manage-
ment," so as to be considered a current owner of the contaminated
site, would be liable under CERCLA and would lose the liability
limitation under the Garn Proposal if some of the acts which caused
the lender to have "participated in management" are deemed to
have "caused or contributed" to the release.
In addition to providing liability limitations, the Garn Proposal
253. S. 651, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 36(a)(l)(A)-(D). See the definition "property
acquired through foreclosure." Id. § 36(h)(I) (including, for example, deeds in lieu of foreclo-
sure); the definition of "fiduciary capacity." Id. § 36(h)(3); and the definition of "extension of
credit" (functional equivalents of loans). Id. § 36(h)(4).
254. Id. § 36(a)(1) (emphasis added). See the definition of "actual benefit." Id. at 36(b)
(not to exceed "fair market value"). The lack of a clear definition of the term "actual benefit"
is a major deficiency of this proposal. Howard and Gerard, supra note 2 at 1211.
255. S. 651, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 36(a)(3).
256. Id. § 36(c).
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addresses the issue of creating uniform standards for lender diligence
at the inception of the loan. The Garn Proposal would also require
the federal banking regulatory agencies and the Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, after consultation with EPA, to pro-
mulgate regulations. These regulations would require lenders to de-
velop and implement procedures to evaluate actual and potential
environmental risks.
257
The La Falce Proposal 58 takes a different approach from the
Garn Proposal in that it would amend both CERCLA and the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. The proposed CER-
CLA amendments would modify the "owner or operator" definition.
The result of this amendment would be to effectively reverse the re-
sult of the capacity to influence test of Fleet Factors.2 59 Further-
more, the LaFalce Proposal would expressly provide that the lender
does not lose the benefit of the Security Interest Exemption by ac-
quisition of title through foreclosure (or deed in lieu of foreclosure)
"so long as he or she diligently is proceeding to sell or convey title on
commercially reasonable terms at the earliest possible time while
preserving the property in the interim." 6" The protection provided to
a lender by these changes in the definition of "owner or operator"
would be forfeited to the extent that the lender caused or exacer-
bated" a release or threatened release.261 The La Falce Proposal,
also, would extend protection to fiduciaries. However, this protection
would be forfeited to the extent the fiduciary caused or exacerbated
a release or a threatened release.262
The LaFalce Proposal attempts to encourage the use of environ-
mental audits by lenders by providing that completion of an "envi-
ronmental inspection or evaluation consistent with good commercial
or customary practice"2 63 is to be treated as "probative evidence" of
an attempt by the lender to "preserve and protect" its security.2"'
257. Id. § 36(g).
258. H.R. 1450, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
259. Id. § 1(a) First, proposed paragraph 101(20)(E)(iii) would define "participating in
the management of a vessel or facility" to mean "actual, direct, and continual or recurrent
exercise of managerial control . . . which . . . materially divests the borrower . . . of such
control. Second, proposed paragraph 101(20)(E)(iv) provides that actions to "preserve and
protect the value" of the lender's security or to "assist the borrower ... in winding down its
operations" are not participation in management.
260. Id. § l(a) (new paragraph 101(20)(F)(iv)). See also, proposed paragraph
101 (20)(F)(v) expressly providing that the exercise of the right to foreclose is not participation
in management. Id.
261. Id. § l(a) (new paragraph 101(20)(F)(vi)).
262. Id. § l(a) (new paragraph 101(20)(F)).
263. The required time of completion is not specified.
264. H.R. 1450, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § l(a) (proposed new paragraph
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The Owens Proposal2"5 would amend CERCLA only. The pro-
posal would amend both the definition of "owner or operator" 66 and
the Innocent Landowner Defense. 267 The amendment of the "owner
or operator" definition would effectively overrule the result of Fleet
Factors capacity to influence test.268 Additionally, the amendment
would allow a lender to remain within the scope of the Security In-
terest Exemption after foreclosure and purchase at the foreclosure
sale.26 9 Furthermore, the definition changes would specify a number
of specific lender activities which would not constitute participation
in management of the borrower. The permissible activities would in-
clude conducting a Phase I environmental audit 270 and specified
"workout" activities. 1 If a lender "causes or contributes to a re-
lease or threatened release", then these amendments are not to be
construed to affect that lender's liability.272
The Owens Proposal's amendment to the Innocent Landowner
Defense would create a rebuttable presumption of appropriate in-
quiry by the lender if a Phase I environmental audit were obtained
by the lender. The Owens Proposal describes an appropriate audit
with great specificity. 27 3
VII. Legislative Proposal
Because of the current uncertainty in the law, corrective federal
legislation should now be enacted. 7 In this process, the many im-
101 (20)(E)(v)).
265. H.R. 1643, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
266. 'Id. § 2.
267. Id. § 3.
268. Id. § 2(a)(2) (new paragraph 101(20)(E)(IV)).
269. Id. 2(a)(2) (new paragraph 101(20)(E)(i)).
270. H.R. 1643, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (new paragraph 101(20)(E)(II)). An-
other provision of the Owens Proposal would require regulatory agencies to take action to
assure that regulated lenders "develop and implement adequate procedures to evaluate poten-
tial environmental risks that may arise from or at vessel or facilities subject to their lending
activities." Id. § 2(c).
271. Id. § 2(a)(2) (new paragraph 101(20)(E)(V)).
272. Id. § 2(d).
273. Id. § 3.
274. Proposed statutory language applicable to CERCLA is set out below. It is also
proposed that similar modifications be made to all federal statutes imposing strict liability for
the release or threatened release of substances causing damage to the environment:
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (42
U.S.C § 9601-9675) is amended as follows:
(A) 42 U.S.C § 9601(20)(A) is amended by deleting the following language: "Such term
does not include any person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility." and by inserting the following in its place: ,"The term 'owner" does not include any
person who holds any indicia of ownership in the vessel or facility primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility as long as that person is not an 'operator' of that vessel
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provements accomplished by the EPA in the course of adopting the
Final EPA Rule should not be abandoned. Those improvements
should be incorporated into new legislation. For example, the correc-
tive legislation should address the liability of all secured lenders
rather than focusing on federally regulated lenders.
First, corrective legislation should modify the Security Interest
Exemption. In that respect, the legislation should simply eliminate
the middle ground now existing between "owner" and "operator"
status for lenders participating in the management of the borrower.
A lender, who is an "owner" by virtue of holding a security interest
in the contaminated property but not an "operator," would be ex-
empt. A lender sufficiently entangled in the borrower's business to be
an "operator" would obtain no benefit from the Security Interest Ex-
emption. In short, lenders would be treated in the same manner as
any other non-owner.
Additionally, the legislation should clarify the intent of Con-
gress to continue the same treatment for lenders who protect their
security interest by foreclosure or the equivalent of foreclosure. The
provisions of the Final EPA could expressly be adopted by Congress
in order to distinguish a former lender who has now taken on the
or facility."
(B) 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) is further amended by adding the following language: "No
person shall be deemed to be an 'owner or operator' solely by reason of an interest in the vessel
or facility held in a fiduciary capacity."
(C) 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) is further amended by adding the following language: "No
person holding an indicia of ownership in the vessel or facility primarily to protect a security
interest and no person holding an unsecured right to payment of a debt from an owner or
operator of the vessel or facility shall be deemed to be 'owner or operator' by reason of engag-
ing in the following activities: [insert here the activities specified in section 300.1 100(c)(2) of
the Final EPA Rule].
(D) 42 U.S.C. § 9601 is amended by adding the following subsections 9601(39), (40) and
(41) and (42): [Insert here the text of sections 300.1100(a) and (b) and (d) of the Final EPA
Rule].
(E) 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) is amended by adding the following language: "The appro-
priate federal supervisory agency for each regulated financial institution shall, after consulta-
tion with the Environmental Agency and no later than [insert date], adopt regulations specify-
ing the circumstances under which each regulated financial institution subject to its
supervision shall be required to investigate whether a vessel or facility offered by a prospective
borrower as security or partial security for a loan by that regulated financial institution has
been contaminated by a hazardous substance and specifying the nature of the investigation
required. Those regulations shall establish categories of loans based on the likelihood of prior
contamination and the nature of the investigation required by those regulations shall vary
based on that likelihood. A regulated financial institution which has complied with the regula-
tions applicable to that regulated financial institution in a particular case shall be deemed to
have undertaken, for purposes of this subparagraph 35(B), all appropriate inquiry into the
previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary
practice. For purposes of this subparagraph (35)(B), appropriate federal supervisory agency'
shall mean [insert names of agencies for various types of institutions] and 'regulated financial
institution' [insert definition]".
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role of an investor from a lender who has been forced to acquire
legal title to protect their security interest.
The Innocent Landowner Defense should also be clarified. First,
Congress should place an affirmative duty on all federally supervised
financial institutions to obtain environmental audits in connection
with environmentally sensitive loans. Second, the standards for the
audits would be most effectively established by the banking supervi-
sory agencies in consultation with the EPA. A lender complying with
these standards should fall within a safe harbor for purposes of the
Innocent Landowner Defense.
Once Congress has enacted these basic structural modifications,
it should add two clarifying provisions to the legislation. First, a fi-
duciary should not have any liability under CERCLA solely because
of their status as a fiduciary. Second, a lender, either secured or un-
secured, who requires assurance of a borrower's compliance with en-
vironmental law should not be liable under CERCLA. In both cases,
these clarifications are consistent with the EPA's stated understand-
ing of the current law. Finally, all federal statutes imposing liability
on lenders for environmental damage should be treated in a consis-
tent fashion. Therefore, conforming amendments should be made to
all such federal statutes.
VIII. Conclusion
The current status of the law of lender liability for hazardous
substance cleanup is simply unacceptable. It is unacceptable primar-
ily because of the lack of certainty which lenders face. This uncer-
tainty is in direct conflict with other significant national interests,
such as the availability of credit to encourage small business devel-
opment and improvement of low and moderate income areas of the
community.
It is impossible to provide lenders with anything approaching
complete certainty. Absent federal preemption, lenders will still face
the prospect of state common law and statutory claims. However, it
is certainly possible to improve the lending climate by making the
federal law of lender liability for hazardous waste cleanup reasona-
bly clear.
The best and most straightforward solution 275 is the elimination
of the "participation in management" aspect of the Security Interest
275. See Hathaway, supra note 238; and Howard and Gerard, supra note 2 at 1220,
1229 (advocating an unjust enrichment approach to lender liability which would strike the
participation in management language from the Security Interest Exemption).
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Exemption. This would eliminate lender liability under federal law
for lender actions as a lender. Lenders, as is clearly the case under
existing law, would remain liable when taking on an "operator," "ar-
ranger," or "transportor" status and would be subject to common
law theories such as aiding and abetting as the courts would deem
appropriate. In addition, a safe harbor component should be incorpo-
rated into the Innocent Landowne Defense. This approach would
both encourage environmentally responsible behavior and improve
the lending climate.
Even if a lender's liability is more clearly defined and limited by
the application of the Final EPA Rule and the enactment of the pro-
posed federal legislation, it is unlikely that that lenders will become
careless in assessing environmental risks upon the collateral securing
their loans or in the administration of those loans. Lenders will con-
tinue to face the business risks that environmental contamination
will render the buyer unable to pay and render the collateral less
marketable. Lenders will also need to plan for the potential liability
arising from state common law and statutory theories of recovery
and to meet the proposed "due diligence standards" imposed by their
supervisory agencies. Such an approach would achieve a more appro-
priate balance among competing national interests than the existing
structure.

